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i
Abstract
It has been suggested that mathematical truth can be accounted for or explained in terms
of infinitary computations. Certain Zenonian arguments against the possibility of performing
such computations raise problems about the structure of time and space. We study the kinds
of spatiotemporal structures that would allow for infinitary computations, and identify where
further work is needed.
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Chapter 0
Introduction
This study has two main aims. One aim is to explain a few of the ways in which infinite sequences
of events are of philosophical interest. The other aim is to investigate the various senses in which
it is possible for infinite sequences of events to occur. In particular, we examine which kinds of
spatiotemporal structures allow for the occurrence of such sequences.
These two aims are interconnected. The plausibility of philosophical views that make use
of infinite sequences of events depends in part on the senses in which it is possible for such
sequences to occur. In this way, the philosophical import of these sequences depends in part
on the senses in which it is possible for them to occur. Also, questions about which sorts of
infinite sequences of events could possibly occur are themselves of interest, tracing back to several
arguments of Zeno of Elea. Once these arguments are made more precise, strengthened, and
generalized, they raise problems about the order types of possible spatiotemporal dimensions,
and about how to conceive of spatiotemporal locations and continuous motion. As we will see,
these Zenonian arguments depend on assumptions about the relationship between the order type
of the temporal dimension and the order types of the spatial dimensions.
Infinite sequences of events are worthy of philosophical study for several reasons. First, it has
been suggested that the conceptual possibility of performing infinite sequences of computations
allows for accounts of (our knowledge of) various portions of mathematical truth. Mathematical
truth, as well as these kinds of accounts of it, and the issues surrounding these accounts, are
topics of independent interest. On such accounts, the truth of a mathematical statement, or our
knowledge of its truth, is analyzed or explained in terms of the existence of a formal proof —
finite or infinite in length — of that statement. Verifying a step in such a proof can be seen as a
task, so that verifying an infinite-length proof requires completing an infinite sequence of tasks.
These kinds of accounts of (our knowledge of) mathematical truth can be motivated by Zermelo’s
views about infinitary languages and infinitary logics, which allow infinitely long expressions and
infinitely long proofs, respectively. Zermelo’s perspective sheds light on many metamathematical
1
2results of recursion theory, proof theory, and model theory, which show certain limitations of
finitary logical systems.
Mathematical properties of infinite-length proofs also bear on debates in the foundations
of mathematics. For example, mathematical theories differ with respect to their provability
strength, and various foundational positions disagree about how much strength is acceptable.
Certain theorems about infinitary proofs can be seen as indicating that if one accepts a particular
infinitary notion of provability, then one can accept the notion of truth in any mathematical
theory that has a particular degree of provability strength. Of course, each such theorem is
itself provable only in theories with a sufficient degree of provability strength. This presents a
number of issues about the philosophical implications of proof-theoretic results.
Another reason that infinite sequences of events are worth studying is that they raise difficult
problems involving various concepts of time, space, motion, continuity, divisibility, set, and
class, among others. For example, there is a family of paradoxes, called dichotomy arguments,
concerning motion through infinitely divisible space and time. Analysis of dichotomy arguments
leads naturally to considering spatiotemporal structures in which dimensions differ from one
another in various ways with respect to their order types. These kinds of possible structural
“mismatches” between time and space give rise to problems about the nature and definiteness
of spatiotemporal locations. Making sense of locations in these sorts of “mismatched” spaces,
and of continuous motion through them, involves subtle mathematical issues.
Uncountable sequences of events are of special interest. Performing uncountably many tasks
in principle allows one to come to know certain non-trivial propositions that could not be known
merely by performing countably many tasks. But not every way that time could be structured
allows for the completion of that many tasks. We will argue that the order type of the temporal
dimension constrains what can be known, by limiting the types of task-sequences that can be
performed. In our example, only if the structure of time allows for the completion of uncountably
many tasks can a particular situation involving ℵ0 physical objects be known to obtain.
Chapter 1 discusses accounts of first-order arithmetical truth in terms of infinitary proof,
and covers a few related issues. We address:
 What reasons are there for accepting infinitary notions of proof in foundational debates?
 How can truth in first-order arithmetic be accounted for using infinitary proofs?
 How do considerations about effectiveness bear on various notions of infinitary proof?
Chapter 2 analyzes paradoxes involving the infinite divisibility of time and space, and
discusses various order types that those dimensions could instantiate. We address:
 How can we make sense of motion through infinitely divisible space and time?
 Is it possible for the dimensions of time and space to differ structurally from one another?
3Chapter 3 argues that the structure of time has epistemological consequences, constraining
which propositions are knowable. We address:
 How can the mathematical structure of time limit the scope of what is knowable?
What kinds of propositions can we come to know only by doing uncountably many tasks?
It is worth making a few remarks at this point. Given a general interest in infinite sequences
of events, we should be permissive about what we count as an “event”. The type of event
that we will often be concerned with is the performance of some kind of task. Sometimes these
tasks will be the performance of a kind of computation. Other times these tasks will be the
performance of a certain type of movement. We do not wish to count every kind of motion
as involving a task, though we will count the occurrence of any kind of motion as being an
event. We require that each event in an event-sequence (i.e., a sequence of events) take its own
non-trivial interval (i.e., an interval containing more than one point) of time, with the intervals
being pairwise non-overlapping. We also require that an event-sequence be linearly ordered in
time, though it need not be well-ordered in time.1
A few definitions will be useful.
• A countably infinite sequence of events is a superevent.
If each event corresponds to a unique task, then the sequence is called a supertask.
• An uncountable sequence of events is a hyperevent.
If each event corresponds to a unique task, then the sequence is called a hypertask.
• A hyperevent that includes a distinct event for each ordinal number is an ultraevent.
If each event corresponds to a unique task, then the sequence is called an ultratask.
• For each infinite linear order type τ ,
a τ -sequence (i.e., a sequence of order type τ) of events is a τ -event.
If each event corresponds to a unique task, then the sequence is called a τ -task.
The presentation in Chapter 2 is unorthodox in that it avoids topology, algebra, and measure
theory, which are often important in discussions of space and time. But many problems involving
infinite sequences of events can be formulated without mentioning those areas of mathematics.
These problems have to do with the order types of the dimensions of space and time, rather
than with their topological, algebraic, or metrical structure. For this reason, we will set aside
issues involving topologies, measures, and metrics. We should explain this choice here.
Standardly, a sequence of tasks is required to occur entirely within a finite-length of time, so
that the task-sequence is completed in a finite-length duration. It would typically be required
1 Recall that a linear ordering is total, transitive, and antisymmetric. A linear order is a well-order
iff each of its non-empty subcollections has a minimal element under the ordering.
4that under an appropriate notion of measure, the interval of time which may be taken to complete
a sequence of tasks is finite in measure. Most of the issues that we will be concerned with do
not depend on whether the interval of time that is taken to finish the task-sequence has a finite
measure. What is important is that the sequence occurs entirely within an interval of time that
(i) contains sufficiently many pairwise non-overlapping subintervals,
with each being “long enough” to allow for the completion of one task,
and
(ii) is bounded, meaning that there are intervals that lie entirely before the interval,
and ones that lie entirely after the interval.
Requirement i need not be understood in terms of a measure. Given our purposes, for an
interval of time to be “long enough” to allow for the doing of a single task, it suffices that the
interval is non-trivial. For example, this rules out completing a task in a single moment (i.e., a
point in time), but it does not rule out completing a task in an infinitesimal interval of time.
Requirement ii ensures that there are times that are before any task in the sequence begins,
and that there are times that are after every task in the sequence ends. In these respects,
measure-theoretic requirements — e.g., that the interval be finite in measure — seem irrelevant.
We will also be ignoring issues involving the various possible topologies of spatiotemporal
structures.2 Our study of spatiotemporal dimensions will be mainly order-theoretic, which
simplifies the presentation. For example, what it is for a position function in this context to be
continuous can be defined purely in terms of order, without using topology. We will see that the
additional structure imposed by a topology and a metric is inessential to certain easily stated
problems about infinite divisibility, spatiotemporal locations, and continuous motion.
2 Allowing topological spaces to be proper-class-sized and even collection-sized, then using the order
and product topologies, all of these spatiotemporal structures are Hausdorff spaces. Also, none are
required to be locally Euclidean.
Our discussion will be phrased in terms of points and intervals. But one can also consider pointless
analogs of these structures as locales. See Picado & Pultr (2012). In this setting, the pointless analog
of the Banach-Tarski theorem fails. For more discussion, see Bauer (2016).
Chapter 1
Portions of mathematical truth
The main purpose of this chapter is to motivate the study of infinite sequences of computations.
First we motivate and describe a way of understanding first-order arithmetical truth in terms
of proofs that can be countably infinite in length. We consider whether such accounts are
extensionally adequate, in terms of capturing every true statement of first-order arithmetic.
Then we criticize several arguments purporting to show that such an account fails to handle
certain arithmetical sentences that Peano Arithmetic neither proves nor refutes. Finally, we
argue that performing a hypertask is compatible with the truths of ZFC.
1.1 True arithmetic
If we count checking a step in a proof as a task, then checking each step in a proof that is
countably infinite in length may be seen as amounting to a supertask, in which we check a
countably infinite sequence of such steps. The conceptual possibility of performing supertasks
allows for one kind of account of the notion truth in T , where T is in a certain class of theories.
A theory is a set of sentences (of some language) that is deductively closed (under that theory’s
corresponding notion of provability).
Theories of particular interest to us will be ones in the language of first-order arithmetic.1
More generally, we will be interested in characterizing the class of theories whose notions of
truth can be adequately accounted for in terms of the possibility of performing supertasks. This
approach can be extended to hypertasks, thereby including proofs of uncountable lengths, in
1 An interesting question is how these classes of theories relate to the various hierarchies measuring
the strength of theories, such as interpretability hierarchies (using various notions of interpretability),
consistency strength hierarchies (relative to various notions of provability), hierarchies that classify
theories by their arithmetical consequences, and others. For more discussion, see Lindstro¨m (2017,
Chapter 6) and Visser (2006).
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6order to account for notions of truth in consistent theories that are stronger than those which
can be accounted for in terms of proofs that are countable in length.
Given this approach to accounting for truth in a theory, there is a kind of situation that we
should be careful to avoid. We are interested in notions of truth in various consistent theories,
i.e., theories in which no sentence of the theory’s language is such that it is both provable in that
theory and refutable in that theory. Note that the consistency of a theory is defined in terms of
provability in that theory. There are consistent theories which when altered to have a stronger
notion of provability — so that additional sentences are provable — result in a theory that is
inconsistent. We should be careful to avoid trying to use an inconsistent theory to account for
notions of truth in its consistent subtheories.2
How might infinite sequences of computations support or explain the notion of truth in
arithmetic, i.e., arithmetical truth? In 1921, Weyl mentioned the possibility of (dis)proving
certain statements in the language of first-order number theory by completing an ω-sequence of
computations. After a discussion of Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, Weyl (2009)
writes:
. . . if the segment of length 1 really consists of infinitely many subsegments of length
1
2 ,
1
4 ,
1
8 , . . ., as of ‘chopped-off’ wholes, then it is incompatible with the character
of the infinite as the ‘incompletable’ that Achilles should have been able to traverse
them all. If one admits this possibility [of traversing a physical distance that consists
of infinitely many subsegments], then there is no reason why a machine should not
be capable of completing an infinite sequence of distinct acts of decision within a
finite amount of time; say, by supplying the first result after 12 minute, the second
after another 14 minute, the third
1
8 minute later than the second, etc. In this way it
would be possible . . . to achieve a traversal of all natural numbers and thereby a sure
yes-or-no decision regarding any existential question about natural numbers! (p. 42)
For certain simple sentences of arithmetic, each numerical instance of the sentence can be tested
sequentially. In order for this idea to support or explain truth in a theory T , it must apply to
every sentence of T .
When T is a theory, an adequate notion of truth in T is thought to require that the theorems
of T be definite (or determinate) in the following respect: T must partition the collection of all
sentences of the language of T into exactly two subcollections — one consisting of those sentences
which are provable in T , and the other consisting of those sentences which are refutable in T .
However, a consistent collection of axioms of a language L (or the corresponding theory) may
be negation-incomplete, meaning that there is an L-sentence σ such that neither σ nor ¬σ is
provable from those axioms under the corresponding notion of provability.3 It is thought that
2 E.g., if we begin with a consistent ω-inconsistent theory, and expand it to allow certain infinitary
rules of proof, the resulting theory is inconsistent. We define ω-inconsistency in §1.3.1, footnote 47.
3 Otherwise the collection of axioms, or the resulting theory, is said to be negation-complete.
7whenever a theory T is negation-incomplete, the notion of truth in T is not adequately clear.
Benacerraf & Putnam (1984) express this thought as follows:4
In [first-order] number theory too [(as in set theory)] there are statements that are
neither provable nor refutable from the axioms of present-day mathematics [(if they
are jointly consistent)]. Intuitionists might agree that this shows (not by itself, of
course, but together with other considerations) that we do not have a clear notion
of “truth” in [first-order] number theory, and that our notion of a “totality of all
integers” is not precise. Most mathematicians would reject this conclusion. Yet
most mathematicians feel that the notion of an “arbitrary set” is somewhat unclear.
What is the reason for this difference in attitude?
Perhaps the reason is that a verification/refutation procedure is inconceivable for
number theory only if we require that the procedure be effective. If we take the stand
that “non-constructive procedures” — i.e., procedures that require us to perform
infinitely many operations in a finite time — are conceivable, . . . then we can say that
there does “in principle” exist a verification/refutation procedure for number theory.
. . . Of course, [a procedure like] this requires working forever, or else completing an
infinite series of operations in a finite time. . . . What this shows is: The notion of
“truth” in number theory is not a dubious one if the notion of a completed actually
infinite series (of, say, definitely specifiable physical operations) is itself not dubious.
. . . In short, if you understand such notions as counting, adding, multiplying, and
seeing if two numbers are equal, [then] we can explain to you the notion of a “true
statement of number theory” (though not if you consistently “boggle” at all quan-
tifications over an infinite domain) . . . (pp. 19–20)
Setting aside the issue of whether this kind of account of truth can also apply to various set
theories, let us stay with the case of first-order number theory. We will motivate and develop
one such account of first-order arithmetical truth in this section and the one following.
True arithmetic (TA) is the set of all sentences of the language LA of first-order arithmetic
that are true in the standard model N of the Dedekind-Peano axioms (including every instance
of the first-order induction schema) of Peano arithmetic (PA).5
One would like to characterize TA with a recursive set of codes of axioms whose closure under
syntactic logical entailment is TA.6 But the set of codes of the sentences in TA is not recursive
or even recursively enumerable, so capturing TA requires some degree of additional means.7 A
4 Unfortunately, Benacerraf & Putnam use “series” instead of “sequence”.
5 TA is Th(N), the theory of N.
6 We assume throughout that PA is consistent.
7 We will ignore deviant codings, e.g., under which all and only sentences in TA are coded by even
natural numbers. See Feferman (1960).
We will also ignore deviant definitions of ‘axiom’ and ‘proof’. Feferman (1990) mentions that
. . . the applicability of Go¨del’s theorem on the underivability in a consistent [formal] system
8recurring theme will be that PA is not strong enough to provide adequate grounds on which to
base an account of first-order arithmetical truth.
Definitions
Let L denote standard classical finitary first-order logic, with equality. In order to include
infinitary logics in our discussion, we need to define a few terms not defined by Go¨del (1931).
A formal language consists of a recursively enumerable set of wffs, which are finite sequences
of symbols.8
A formal system S consists of:
(i) a formal language LS ,
(ii) a recursively enumerable set AS of axioms (which are certain LS-sentences),
(iii) a recursive relation `S which determines the proofs in S.
A semi-formal system is like a formal system except that nothing need be recursive, or even
recursively enumerable.
We will say that a (semi-)formal system is fully recursive iff the sets corresponding to its
wffs and its axioms are both recursive, and its provability-relation is recursive as well.
For each n∈N, let n be the numeral for n.
For each LA-wff ϕ, let #(ϕ) be the code of ϕ, and let pϕq be the numeral for #(ϕ).9
In order to explain how PA falls short of capturing first-order arithmetical truth, we need
to mention a few metamathematical results. A corollary of Rosser’s (1936) strengthening of
Go¨del’s (1931) first incompleteness theorem is that for any sufficiently strong consistent formal
system S that is fully recursive:10
S of the consistency statement ConS depends essentially on how S is presented. That
is, . . . for suitable S, another presentation S∗ of S could be given, with the same set of
theorems, for which S∗ ` ConS∗ . In Takeuti 1955 this was done by changing the set of
rules generating the theorems, in Feferman 1960 by changing the description of the set of
axioms, and in Kreisel 1965 by changing the description of the set of proofs. (p. 282)
8 For each positive integer n, we write ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) to indicate that ϕ has exactly n free variables.
9 From the context, it should be clear which coding this is relative to.
10 In 1947, Turing (Ince, 1992) remarks that:
. . . if a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent. There are several
mathematical theorems which say almost exactly that. (p. 124)
9There is an LS-wff ϕ(v1) such that ∀n∈N, `S ϕ(n), but 0S ∀xϕ(x).
This property of (semi-)formal systems is called ω-incompleteness. In such a case, if
0S ¬∀xϕ(x),
then S is negation-incomplete. PA’s ω-incompleteness is witnessed by PA’s Go¨del sentences
(among others), which are neither PA-provable nor PA-refutable.11
We have just stated a syntactic form of the first incompleteness theorem for LA-theories.
Some semantic forms of the first incompleteness theorem state that for certain LA-theories,
there are LA-sentences that are true in N but are not provable in that theory. Before stating
generalizations of these theorems, we need a few more definitions.
First we define the arithmetic hierarchy of LA-formulas.
A Σ0-formula, Π0-formula, or ∆0-formula is an LA-wff that contains no unbounded quan-
tifiers.
For each n ≥ 1, we define Σn-formulas and Πn-formulas inductively.
For each n ≥ 1, an LA-wff is a Σn+1-formula iff it has the form
∃~x ϕ(~x, y),
where ϕ is a Πn-formula.
For each n ≥ 1, an LA-wff is a Πn+1-formula iff it has the form
∀~x ϕ(~x, y),
where ϕ is a Σn-formula.
For each n ≥ 1, an LA-wff is a ∆n-formula iff it is PA-provably equivalent to both a
Σn-formula and a Πn-formula.
For example, here are the special cases of Π1-formulas, Σ1-formulas, and Π2-formulas.
A Π1-formula is an LA-wff of the form
∀y ψ(~x, y),
where ψ contains no unbounded quantifiers.
A Σ1-formula is an LA-wff of the form
∃y ψ(~x, y),
11 We sometimes speak of a (semi-)formal system as if it were just the set of sentences that are
provable from its axioms, relative to that system’s notion of a proof.
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where ψ contains no unbounded quantifiers.
A Π2-formula is an LA-wff of the form
∀y ψ(~x, y),
where ψ is a Σ1-formula.
Recall that for any function f and X ⊆ dom(f),
f [X] :=
{
f(x) : x∈X}.
Recall that a countable theory T is recursively enumerable iff #[T ] is recursively enumerable.
For each n∈N, an LA-theory T is Σn-sound iff for every Σn-sentence σ,
`T σ =⇒ N |= σ.
For each n ∈N, an LA-theory T is Πn-complete iff it is negation-complete with respect to
the set of Πn-sentences, i.e., for every Πn-sentence σ,
`T σ or `T ¬σ.
Otherwise we say that T is Πn-incomplete.
A countable theory T is definable in N iff #[T ] is definable in N.
For each n∈N, an LA-theory T is Σn-definable iff there is a set T ′ of LA-sentences such
that both {
σ : T ′ `L σ
}
= T ,
and there is a Σn-formula ϕ(v1) such that ∀m∈N
m ∈ #[T ′] ⇐⇒ N |= ϕ(m).
I.e., there is a set T ′ of LA-sentences whose closure under L is T , and the set of codes of
the sentences in T ′ is definable in N by a Σn-formula.
For each n ∈ N, the set of Πn-sentences is the closure of the set of Πn-sentences under
conjunction, disjunction, existential quantification and bounded universal quantification.
For each n∈N, an LA-theory is Πn-complete iff it is negation-complete with respect to the
set of Πn-sentences. Otherwise it is Πn-incomplete.
For each n∈N, an LA-theory T is n-consistent iff for each Σn-formula ϕ(v1),
∀n∈N `T ϕ(n) =⇒ 0T ∃x ¬ϕ(x).
Finally, let Q denote Robinson arithmetic.
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1.1.1 Forms of imbalance
A nice way of understanding semantic forms of the first incompleteness theorem is that they
result from an imbalance between the syntactic (proof) power of L and the semantic (expressive)
power of LA. For an example of a distinction along these lines, Carnap (1931) distinguishes
between logicism’s definabilty thesis (that mathematical concepts are explicitly definable in
terms of purely logical concepts), and logicism’s provability thesis (that mathematical theorems
are derivable from purely logical theorems by purely logical means).
One semantic form of the first incompleteness theorem about LA-theories states that for
each n ≥ 1:12
For each Σn-sound Σn+1-definable LA-theory T ,
there is a Πn+1-sentence that is true in N but neither T -provable nor T -refutable.
In the case of n = 1, this implies that: if S is a set of LA-sentences, and
(i) #[S] is definable in N by a Σ2-formula,
and
(ii) for each Σ1-sentence σ,
S `L σ =⇒ N |= σ,
then there is a Π2-sentence σ such that
N |= σ,
S 0L σ,
S 0L ¬σ.
In this case, L-provability is not strong enough to ensure the Π2-completeness of{
σ : S `L σ
}
when the set S of LA-axioms meets conditions i and ii. In this sense, there is an imbalance
between the (semantic) expressiveness of LA and the (syntactic) L-provability relation.
The purely syntactic forms of the first incompleteness theorem can be viewed analogously
as resulting from an imbalance between provability in L and representability, which is a purely
12 See Theorem 2.5 in Salehi & Seraji (2016).
Generalizing semantic versions of the first incompleteness theorem in the setting of institution theory
is an open problem. For a discussion of institution theory, see Diaconescu (2008).
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syntactic notion. For example, one syntactic form of the first incompleteness theorem about
LA-theories states that for each n ≥ 1:13
Each n-consistent Σn+1-definable LA-theory that extends Q is Πn+1-incomplete.
In the case of n = 1, this implies that: if S is a set of LA-sentences, and
(1) #[S] is definable in N by a Σ2-formula,
(2) for each σ∈Q,
S `L σ,
and
(3) for each Σ1-formula ϕ(v1),
∀n∈N S `L ϕ(n) =⇒ S 0L ∃x ¬ϕ(x),
then there is a Π2-sentence σ such that
S 0L σ,
S 0L ¬σ.
In this case, provability in L is not strong enough to ensure the Π2-completeness of{
σ : S `L σ
}
when the set S of LA-axioms meets conditions 1, 2, and 3. This too is an imbalance between
the expressiveness of LA and the L-provability relation.
Representation systems
Here is a nice illustration of an imbalance in several theorems that apply to countable theories
even in languages other than LA. Smullyan (1961, Chapter 3) defines a representation system
as an ordered sextuple 〈
E,S, T,R,P,Φ
〉
,
where:
13 See Theorem 4.3 in Salehi & Seraji (2016).
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E is a countably infinite set of expressions,
S ⊆ E is the set of sentences,
T ⊆ S is the set of theorems (i.e., those sentences that that system proves),
R ⊆ S is the set of refutable sentences (i.e., those sentences that that system refutes),
P ⊆ E is the set of unary predicates, and
Φ: E×N −→ E
is a total “representation” function such that
∀H∈P ∀n∈N Φ(〈H,n〉) ∈ S.
For any A ⊆ N, a unary predicate H represents A iff
A =
{
n∈N : Φ(〈H,n〉) ∈ T}.
A representation system is consistent iff
T ∩R = ∅.
A representation system is complete iff
T ∪R = S.
Smullyan (1961) proves three main theorems that are relevant here:
(1) The complement (with respect to N) of the set of codes of the provable sentences of a
representation system is not representable in that system.
(2) If the set of codes of the refutable sentences of a representation system is representable
in that system, then that system is either inconsistent or incomplete.
(3) If a representation system can represent a subset of N that is both
(i) a superset of the set of codes of that system’s refutable sentences, and
(ii) disjoint from the set of codes of that system’s provable sentences,
then that system is incomplete.
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The point is that these three theorems are syntactic, and each can be seen as describing a kind
of imbalance between what is provable in a representation system and what is representable in
one.
This notion of an imbalance between provability and representability also applies to cases in
which our language is infinitary, and even uncountable. Questions about this kind of (im)balance
make sense even when both the provability strength of a system and its representability strength
are characterized by infinitary notions. In a manner of speaking, provability-strength and
representability-strength come in degrees, even when they are infinitary.
We can generalize Smullyan’s notion of a representation system to include languages of
any infinite cardinality. Instead of taking a predicate to represent a subset of N, we can take a
predicate to represent a subset of an infinite cardinal κ, with κ equal to — or otherwise depending
on — the cardinality of the set of expressions. Instead of coding syntactic entities like formulas,
proofs, etc. using natural numbers, we can code them using ordinal numbers (including non-
recursive ordinals).14 One can then prove generalizations of the Tarski, Go¨del, and Rosser
theorems, respectively, about representability in these transfinite representation systems.15
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems
The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems can also be understood in terms of a syntactic-semantic im-
balance in set-sized first-order languages that are finititary. First we should define what it is for
a system to be “finitary”.
A language is finitary iff it has only countably many formulas, and each formula is finite in
length.
A logic is finitary iff each of its proofs are finite in length, and finite in width (i.e., each step
in each proof requires only finitely many premises).
A system is finitary iff both its language and its logic are finitary.
To explain how the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems indicate an imbalance between the syntactic
power of such systems and their semantic power, we will state a version of these theorems.
14 Recall that an ordinal α is recursive iff there is a recursive well-ordering, with order type α, of a
subset of N.
15 For an extension of the incompleteness theorems to the context of transfinite computation, see
Patarin (2012).
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Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems
Let L be any set-sized first-order language that is finitary.
Let κ be a cardinal such that
|L| ≤ κ.
Let A be an L-structure such that
ℵ0 ≤ |A| ≤ κ.
Downward : A has elementary substructures of every cardinality λ for
ℵ0 ≤ λ ≤ κ.
Upward : A has elementary extensions of every cardinality greater than κ,
and of proper-class-size.
In the important special case of finitary first-order languages that are countably infinite:
For each infinite model M for a finitary first-order countably infinite language L,
there are L-models of every infinite cardinality that are elementarily equivalent to M,
and L-models of proper-class-size that are elementarily equivalent to M.
The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems show that no set of sentences of any finitary first-order
system can distinguish between various infinite sizes of mathematical structures. If a set of
sentences of such a language is satisfied by an infinite model (for that language), then that set of
sentences is also satisfied by elementarily equivalent models (for that language) of every infinite
cardinality, and of proper-class-size.
One way to reduce these various kinds of imbalance is to move to a logic with the same
semantic power as that of L, but with somewhat more syntactic power. In particular, we
will consider expanding PA by allowing proofs to have infinite ordinal-lengths, with a rule of
inference using an ω-sequence of premisses.16 The resulting theory does not avoid every kind of
imbalance that we have described. For example, it still has elementarily equivalent models of
different infinite sizes.17 But unlike PA, the theory that we will consider is negation-complete.18
16 In 1934, Carnap (2003, §14) allowed proofs of infinite lengths in his Language I, using a rule that
is similar to the ω-rule that we will define in §1.2.
17 Recall that TA has nonstandard models.
18 Two relevant questions are:
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Now we motivate the move away from PA by describing a few of its shortcomings.
1.1.2 Recursiveness outstrips PA
This section discusses limitations of PA having to do with recursiveness, in order to motivate
considering stronger theories in order to capture TA. In §1.2, we will describe theories with the
same axioms as PA but with stronger provability relations.
There is a precise sense in which PA does not fully capture the notion of “being a total
recursive function”. In order to see this, we will need a few definitions.
Recall that a k-ary relation R on Nk is definable in N iff
there is an LA-wff ϕ(v1, . . . , vk) such that ∀n1, . . . , nk∈N,
〈n1, . . . , nk〉 ∈ R ⇐⇒ N |= ϕ(n1, . . . , nk),
in which case we say that ϕ defines R.
For each k-ary total recursive function
f : Nk −→ N,
there is an Σ1-formula that defines (the graph of) f . Recall also that every total recursive
function is representable in PA by a Σ1-formula. In particular, for each unary total recursive
function f ,
there is a Σ1-formula ϕ(v1, v2) that defines f such that ∀x, y∈N,
f(x) = y =⇒ `PA ϕ(x, y),
f(x) 6=y =⇒ `PA ¬ϕ(x, y).
A total recursive function that is not PA-provably recursive
Kirby & Paris (1982) showed that there are true finitary statements, which are number-theoretic
(rather than metamathematical) in character, that are not PA-provable. In particular, there is
a unary total recursive function — called the Goodstein function — that PA does not prove is
total, even though the function is definable in N.19
Q1: What are the various senses in which a system can be “balanced”?
Q2: How can we make sense of what it is for a system to be “maximally balanced”?
19 For other such functions, see Kaye (1991, Chapter 14) and Ha´jek & Pudla´k (2017, Chapter IV, §3).
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Let the Goodstein function be defined by the Σ1-formula G(v1), named after Goodstein’s
theorem.
Now, the Π2-sentence that expresses the fact that the Goodstein function is a total function
is true in the standard model, i.e.,
N |= ∀x∃!y G(x) = y.
PA proves each numerical instance of that sentence;
∀n∈N `PA ∃!y G(n) = y, so
∀n∈N `PA ∃y G(n) = y, but
0PA ∀x ∃y G(x) = y.
This is another instance of PA’s ω-incompleteness. In this sense, PA does not prove anything
that is equivalent to a statement that expresses the fact that the Goodstein function is total.20
As we will say, the Goodstein function is not PA-provably total. For any particular number, PA
proves that when one inputs that number to the Goodstein function, there is a unique number
that the function outputs. But PA cannot prove that for any number that one inputs to the
Goodstein function, the function outputs a number. In this way, the total recursiveness of the
Goodstein function is beyond PA.
Total recursive functions that are not PA-provably total yield arithmetical statements that
are neither PA-provable nor PA-refutable. Each of those statements expressess that one of those
functions is total.
PA cannot fully capture the notion of being a total recursive function. It can be shown
that the predicate “is the code of a total recursive function” is not representable in PA. If that
predicate were representable in PA, then there would be an LA-formula ϕ(v1) such that ∀n∈N,
n is the code of a total recursive function =⇒ `PA ϕ(n),
n is not the code of a total recursive function =⇒ `PA ¬ϕ(n).
But this could not be the case. Firstly, the set of indices of total recursive functions is not
recursive.21 So the characteristic function of the set of indices of total recursive functions is
20 Since the Goodstein function is total, one might think that
the statement that the Goodstein function is total
is equivalent to
the statement that 0 = 0.
In this sense, there is a PA-provable sentence that is “equivalent” to the statement that the Goodstein
function is total. But we have in mind a stronger notion of equivalence.
21 This is a corollary of Rice’s Theorem. See Theorem II.2.9 in Odifreddi (1992, §II.2).
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not a total recursive function. But the total recursive functions correspond exactly to the
functions that are representable in PA. So the characteristic function of the set of indices of
total recursive functions is not representable in PA. Thus, the predicate “is the code of a total
recursive function” is not representable in PA.
Consistent decidable LA-theories that are not PA-provably decidable
There are other limitations of PA involving the notion of recursiveness. For example, there are
unary total recursive functions (besides the Goodstein function) that not PA-provably total, and
which are more relevant for our purposes. One such function is the characteristic function of the
set of codes of the sentences in a particular consistent recursive LA-theory. First, a definition.
Recall that a countable theory T is recursive iff #[T ] is recursive.
There is a precise sense in which PA does not fully capture the notion of “being a decidable
LA-theory”. In particular, there are consistent recursive LA-theories which are not PA-provably
recursive. In other words, PA does not prove any statement that expresses the fact that “the
set of codes of the theorems of that theory is recursive”.22 What we want to show is that there
are consistent recursive LA-theories t such that the characteristic function of the set of codes of
the sentences in t is not PA-provably total.
First we show that the set of codes of recursive LA-theories is not recursively enumerable.
For each n∈N, let Tn denote
the theory that is enumerated by the Turing machine whose index is n.
Denote the set of all such theories by T , so that
T := {Tn : n∈N}
Now we define the set of indices of Turing machines that enumerate the codes of theories
that are recursive. Define
R :=
{
n∈N : Tn is recursive
}
.
Lemma: R is not recursively enumerable.
Proof (sketch): Let F be the set of indices of total recursive functions. It can be shown
that F is many-one reducible to R, meaning that there is a unary total recursive function
f such that ∀n∈N,
n ∈ F ⇐⇒ f(n) ∈ R.
22 This limitation of PA is relevant even though no such LA-theory has all of its theorems true in N.
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If R were recursively enumerable, then F too would be recursively enumerable. But a simple
diagonal argument shows that F is not recursively enumerable. Thus, R is not recursively
enumerable either.
Now we show that there is a recursive LA-theory that is not PA-provably recursive. Define
the subset of R that consists of the indices of Turing machines that enumerate LA-theories
for which the characteristic function of the set of codes of sentences that are in that theory is
PA-provably total. To this end, define
RPA :=
{
n∈R : `PA “Tn is recursive ”
}
.
For PA to prove that “Tn is recursive” is for PA to prove, of the characteristic function cf of
the set of codes of the theorems of Tn, that cf is total. R
PA is a recursively enumerable subset
of R, since the set of codes of theorems of PA is recursively enumerable. By the lemma above,
R is not recursively enumerable. Thus,
R \RPA 6=∅.
I.e., there is a recursive LA-theory that is not PA-provably recursive.
Now we show that such theories are consistent. Let z be the index of a Turing machine that
enumerates a recursive theory such that the characteristic function of the set of codes of the
theorems of that theory is not PA-provably total. Suppose for reductio that Tz is inconsistent.
Then since Tz proves the sentence
0 6=0,
PA proves that Tz is inconsistent. But then Tz is PA-provable recursive, which contradicts that
Tz is not PA-provable recursive. Therefore Tz is consistent.
This is what we intended to show. There are consistent recursive LA-theories that are not
PA-provably recursive. Such theories are consistent and decidable, but are not PA-provably
decidable.
PA cannot fully capture the notion of being a recursive LA-theory. In order for PA to fully
capture that notion, every recursive LA-theory t would have to be such that the characteristic
function of the set of codes of the sentences in t is PA-provably total. But not every recursive
LA-theory has that property.
Further, it can be shown that the predicate “is the code of a recursive LA-theory” is not rep-
resentable in PA. The set of codes of recursive LA-theories is not recursive, so the characteristic
function of that set is not total recursive. Since every total function that is representable in PA
is recursive, the characteristic function of the set of codes of recursive LA-theories is not repre-
sentable in PA. Thus, the predicate “is the code of a recursive LA-theory” is not representable
in PA.
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PA is inadequate for capturing certain facts about total recursive functions, and for capturing
certain facts about consistent recursive LA-theories. There are many other limitations of PA.
L too has many well known expressive limitations. The next subsection covers only a few such
limitations.
1.1.3 Finitistic prejudice
Now we turn to Zermelo’s doubts about the adequacy of finitary logics for capturing mathemat-
ical truth. This section briefly sketches those parts of Zermelo’s views that relate most directly
to infinitary proofs. References to Zermelo’s writings are from Ebbinghaus, Kanamori & Fraser
(2010). We also follow Ebbinghaus (2015, §§4.8–4.10). Our main concern here is to give a rough
idea of Zermelo’s thoughts on these issues in order to motivate the kind of account of first-order
arithmetical truth that we discuss in §1.2.
Taylor (Ebbinghaus, Kanamori & Fraser, 2010, p. 304) writes that “the real issue dividing
Zermelo from his contemporaries is his ultra-liberal conceptions of constructibility, provabil-
ity, and definability”. For Zermelo, “theorems are truth functional consequences of axioms”
(Ebbinghaus, Kanamori & Fraser, 2010, p. 305), rather than merely finite-length statements for
which there are finite-length proofs.
Zermelo holds that finitary axiomatic systems cannot capture the full richness of mathemat-
ics, and that only infinitary languages are adequate for that purpose. Certain proofs require
applications of “infinitary induction”, which is a rule of inference that uses infinitely many
premisses. We quote Zermelo (s1921 ):
Every genuine mathematical proposition is “infinitary” in character, that is, it is con-
cerned with an infinite domain and is to be considered a collection of infinitely many
“elementary propositions”. . . . Since infinitary propositions can never be derived
from finitary ones, the “axioms” of any mathematical theory, too, must be infinitary
. . . Traditional “Aristotelian” logic is, according to its nature, finitary, and hence
not suited for the foundation of mathematical science. Whence the necessity of an
extended “infinitary” or “Platonic” logic that rests on some kind of infinitary “in-
tuition” — as, e.g., in connection with the question of the “axiom of choice” . . .
Every mathematical proposition must be considered a collection of (infinitely many)
elementary propositions, . . . and every deduction of a proposition from other propo-
sitions, in particular every “proof”, is nothing but a “regrouping” of the underlying
elementary propositions. (p. 307)
We will not dwell on the details of the passage just quoted. But it is clear that Zermelo
conceives of mathematical proofs as infinitary entities. Zermelo (s1929b) also stresses that only
axiomatic systems that are negation-complete are adequate for mathematics:
. . . the ideal of a mathematical discipline would be a system of propositions that
already contains all [of the] propositions [that are] derivable from it by purely logical
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means, that is, a “logically complete system”. A “complete” system is, e.g., the
totality of all logical consequences derivable from a given system of basic assumptions,
an “axiom system”. But not every “complete system” is necessarily determined by
means of a finite number of axioms. One and the same complete system can be
given by means of several, and even infinitely many, different axiom systems, such as
Euclidean geometry or the arithmetic of the reals and that of the complex numbers.
A complete system is therefore the “invariant”, so to speak, of all equivalent axiom
systems, and the question of the “independence” of the axioms does not concern it.
A complete system is related to every axiom system determining it like a “field” is
related to its “basis”, and the investigation of such “complete systems” may hold
promise of greater generality and clarity similar to that inherent in the transition
from algebraic equations to algebraic fields. (p. 377)
Zermelo has in mind axiomatic systems that contain infinite-length propositions as well as
infinite-length proofs. He understands quantifiers as set-sized conjunctions or disjunctions, i.e.,
with set-many conjuncts or disjuncts. Zermelo (s1929b) writes that:
. . . true mathematics is infinitistic according to its nature and rests on the assumption
of infinite domains; it may even be called the “logic of the infinite”. (p. 383)
Ebbinghaus (2015) describes Zermelo’s conception of mathematical propositions and proofs
as follows:
In essence, a proposition or a proof of it is not a syntactical string of signs, but an
ideal (infinitary) object. This is in total contrast to the concepts underlying Go¨del’s
[incompleteness] result[s]. With Go¨del the finitary representability of the system in
question is indispensable. For only then can one code axioms, propositions, and
proofs in an effective way by natural numbers, and the presupposed arithmetical
power of the system then allows provability to be treated in the system itself. . . . For
Zermelo this procedure renders [the] incompleteness [of finitary axiomatic systems] a
trivial fact: As the set of provable propositions in Go¨del’s [finitistic] sense is countable
and as there are uncountably many true infinitary propositions, there is of course a
true [infinitary] proposition which is not provable in Go¨del’s [finitistic] sense. (p. 227)
Given any finitary axiomatic system that meets the hypothesis of various forms of the first
incompleteness theorem, Go¨del’s method allows one to define a finitary proposition that is
neither provable nor disprovable in that system. In any case, Zermelo sees the imbalance between
L’s syntactic power and its semantic power as essentially tied to its finitary restrictions — i.e.,
the requirement that formulas and proofs be finite in length. He views several theorems as
demonstrating that finitary axiomatic systems have unacceptable limitations. We will mention
four such theorems, but many others can be seen in this light too.
Firstly, there is the downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem.23 Applied to countable lan-
guages, one form of this theorem states that every set of sentences in a countable finitary
23 For a generalization of the downwards Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, see Ga˘ina˘ (2015).
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first-order language that has a model has a countable model. From Zermelo’s perspective, this
feature of finitary first-order languages is objectionable because it means that such languages
cannot uniquely characterize (up to isomorphism) an uncountable mathematical structure. No
set of sentences of such a language is satisfied in all and only the uncountable models of that
language. Nor can such languages characterize the notion of being a countable mathematical
structure. No set of sentences of such a language is satisfied in all and only the countable models
of that language.
While Skolem saw the countable vs. uncountable distinction as being relative to a model of
first-order set theory, Zermelo rejected such a view. But Zermelo (1930a) does hold that the set
vs. proper class distinction is relative to a model of the second-order axioms of set theory.
Hodges (2008, p. 267) mentions that Skolem “didn’t believe in the existence of uncountable
sets”. Zermelo (s1930d) writes that:
For Skolem, it is supposed to be possible to represent set theory in its entirety already
in a countable model, and, e.g., the problem of the cardinality of the continuum
already loses its real significance for him. (p. 439)
Zermelo (s1930d) also mentions that:
. . . Cantor’s (generalized) conjecture [GCH] (according to which the power set of any
set is supposed to always be of the immediately succeeding cardinality) does not
depend on the choice of the model, but that it is decided (as true or false) once and
for all by means of our [second-order] axiom system. (p. 437)
Secondly, there is the upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem.24 Applied to countable lan-
guages, one version of this theorem can be stated as follows.
Let κ be any infinite cardinal. Then for each cardinal λ > κ,
every set of sentences in a countable finitary first-order language that has a κ-size model
has a λ-size model.
Such languages are unable to uniquely characterize (up to isomorphism) mathematical structures
of any particular infinite cardinal size. For each infinite cardinal κ, no set of sentences of such a
language is satisfied in all and only the κ-size models of that language. This is another way in
which the expressiveness of such finitary languages is limited.
24 Generalizing the upwards Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem in the setting of institution theory is an
open problem.
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Thirdly, there is the compactness theorem for L.25 This theorem states that for every set S
of sentences in a finitary first-order language, if every finite subset of S has a model, then S has
a model.26 Recall that this theorem implies that every set of finitary first-order sentences that
has arbitrarily large finite models has an infinite model. In classical model theory, compactness
is seen as a very nice property to have around for various constructions. But whenever the
compactness property holds, no set of sentences can uniquely characterize the notion of a finite
mathematical structure. No set of sentences of such a language is satisfied in all and only the
finite models of that language. On Zermelo’s view, this severe expressive limitation of finitary
first-order languages is unacceptable.27
Fourthly, there is Go¨del’s (1931) original formulation of the first incompleteness theorem. In
his October 12, 1931 letter to Go¨del, Zermelo (s1931b, p. 489) writes:
As with the Richard and Skolem paradoxes, the mistake is due to the (incorrect)
assumption that it is possible to represent every mathematically definable concept
by means of a “finite combination of signs” (in accordance with a fixed [axiomatic]
system!). In other words, [it is due to] what I call the “finitistic prejudice”. Actually
things are quite different, and a reasonable “meta-mathematics” will only be possible
once we have overcome this prejudice, a matter which I have made my special duty.
Zermelo took incompleteness to be an undesirable feature of finitary axiomatic systems that
are non-trivial, in the sense of being both consistent and sufficiently strong. In his October 29,
1931 letter to Go¨del, Zermelo (s1931d) writes that:
. . . all [that] you prove in your [1931] paper amounts to what I, too, always stress,
namely that a “finitistically restricted” proof schema is not sufficient for “deciding”
the propositions of an uncountable mathematical system. . . . I, at the very outset,
proceeded from a more general [infinitistic proof] schema, . . . And in this [infinitistic]
system now really any proposition whatsoever is decidable! (p. 501)
Taylor (Ebbinghaus, Kanamori & Fraser, 2010) explains the sense in which every proposition
of such a system is decided by that system:
In 1931d Zermelo writes in effect that, in one of his own systems of infinitely long
propositions [and infinitely long proofs], each and every (conditional) proposition is
decidable in the sense that, “under the validity of [its antecedent], the validity of
[its consequent] can be made obvious”. The discussion there suggests that indeed, a
25 This theorem generalizes to a compactness theorem for a particular class of infinitary logics. See
Barwise & Feferman (2017, §5.6 and §6.2).
26 See Chang & Keisler (2012, §2.1). In 1930, Go¨del proved that the compactness property holds for
countable sets of such sentences. The same result is nearly proven in Skolem (1922).
27 Zermelo should have complained about the compactness of L. I imagine that he did.
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decision procedure for logical consequence is what Zermelo offers, despite its involving
potentially infinitely many steps. (pp. 535–536)
Taylor (Ebbinghaus, Kanamori & Fraser, 2010, p. 537) also mentions that Zermelo’s 1932b
paper “reiterates his claim that all propositions of a system S are decidable, where the deci-
sion procedure involves reasoning about something such as an infinite truth table or semantic
tableau”.
The “finitary prejudice” that Zermelo mentions is a prejudice against infinitary proofs and
infinitary propositions. Zermelo (1932a, pp. 543–545) writes:
Proceeding from the assumption that it should be possible to represent all mathemat-
ical concepts and theorems by means of a fixed finite system of signs, we inevitably
run into the well-known “Richard’s antinomy” already in the case of the arithmeti-
cal continuum. This antinomy, which seemed long buried, has recently celebrated
a merry resurrection in the form of Skolemism, i.e. the doctrine that every mathe-
matical theory, including set theory, can be realized in a countable model. . . . But a
healthy “metamathematics”, a true “logic of the infinite”, will only become possible
once we have definitively renounced the assumption characterized above, which I
would like to call the “finitistic prejudice”. Mathematics, generally speaking, is not
really concerned with “combinations of signs”, as some assume, but with conceptually
ideal relations among the elements of a conceptually posited infinite manifold.
Zermelo (1932a) adds that the existence of propositions that are undecidable relative to some
particular finitary axiomatic system does not touch on the deeper issue of absolutely undecidable
propositions.
This whole argument [for Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem], in my opinion, only
serves as evidence for the inadequacy of any “finitistic” proof theory without, how-
ever, providing the means to remove this ill. Such relativistic considerations in no
way touch on the real question as to whether there are absolutely undecidable propo-
sitions or absolutely unsolvable problems in mathematics. (p. 547)
This subsection mentioned only a few natural mathematical concepts that are not expressible
in finitary first-order systems. There are many other such concepts. We now turn to infinitary
logics.
1.2 Infinitary logics
This section aims to motivate the study of infinite sequences of tasks by considering several
accounts or explanation of first-order arithmetical truth.
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The unrestricted ω-rule
Since TA is negation-complete, it is natural to consider adding to PA — in hopes of capturing
TA — the ω-rule for PA:28
For each LA-wff ϕ(v1),
if ∀n∈N `PA ϕ(n), then let `PA ∀xϕ(x).
Let PAω be the semi-formal system that is like PA but allows proofs to contain any ordinal-
length sequence of applications of the ω-rule.29 PAω-proofs correspond to ordinal-height trees
of formulae.30 PAω is negation-complete.
Every σ∈TA is PAω-provable, i.e.,
TA ⊆ {LA-sentences σ : `PAω σ}.
If PAω is consistent, then {LA-sentences σ : `PAω σ} = TA.
This is the sense in which PAω captures TA.
The recursive ω-rule
Moving to a semi-formal system that allows proofs of infinite length, one would like to get an
“effective grip” on what counts as a proof in that system. Given a total recursive coding, one
way to allow each infinite proof that uses the ω-rule to be represented by a finite object (i.e.,
a natural number) is to exclude any application of the ω-rule to an ω-sequence of formulas
whenever the codes of their PAω-proofs form a non-recursive subset of N. If i is the index of a
unary total recursive function f such that
∀n∈N f(n) is the code of a PAω-proof of ϕ(n),
then a PAω-proof of ∀xϕ can be identified with the finite number that codes the ordered pair
28 Tarski (1931, p. 260) in a footnote claims to have “pointed out the importance of the rule of infinite
induction in the year 1926”. In 1934, Carnap (2003, §14) made use of such a rule in his Language I.
29 The subscript in ‘PAω’ refers to the unrestricted ω-rule.
30 Derevyankina (1974) mentions that:
The principal shortcoming of such a method of investigation of completeness consists in the
fact that although the deduction tree . . . is an effective object of study, the predicate “being
a deduction tree” is not an arithmetic[al] predicate. (p. 210)
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i,#(∀xϕ)〉.
In this way, such functions are used to encode ω-sequences of recursively codable PAω-proofs.
This restriction to the ω-rule for PA yields the recursive ω-rule for PA:31
For each LA-wff ϕ(v1),
if there is a unary total recursive function f such that
∀n∈N f(n) is the code of a PAω-proof of ϕ(n),
then let `PA ∀x ϕ(x).
Let PAρ-ω be the system that is like PA except that it allows a proof to contain any number
of applications of the recursive ω-rule.32 Not all PAρ-ω-proofs are recursive, since some have
ordinal heights that are so large that no total recursive function can code such a proof.
Let PAω2 be the semi-formal system that is like PA except that it allows a proof to contain up
to (but not including) ω2 applications of the recursive ω-rule.33 This means that each PAω2-proof
is a PAρ-ω-proof that uses the recursive ω-rule fewer than ω
2 times in total.
Goldfarb (1975) showed that each sentence of TA is derivable in PAω2 , i.e.,
TA ⊆
{
LA-sentences σ : `PAω2 σ
}
.
Thus, PAω2 is negation-complete, and every PAω-provable sentence is PAω2 -provable. In par-
ticular, ∀σ ∈ TA, ∃n ∈ N such that there is a PAω2-proof of σ that includes no longer than
an (ω×n)-sequence of applications of the recursive ω-rule. Thus, for each σ ∈ TA, proving σ
from within PAω2 requires at most finitely many ω-sequences of applications of the recursive
ω-rule.34 We now consider the ways in which infinitary proofs can be used to account for or
explain first-order arithmetical truth.
31 Unfortunately this rule is sometimes called the effective ω-rule.
32 The subscript in ‘PAρ-ω’ refers to the recursive ω-rule.
33 The subscript in ‘PAω2 ’ refers to the limit on the ordinal-length of the total sequence of applications
of the recursive ω-rule that a PAω2 -proof may contain.
34 Derevyankina (1974) writes that:
. . . Belyakin [[1967]] has described an algorithm that assigns (in the semi-formal system
considered by him [that includes a recursive ω-rule]) to any arithmetic formula ϕ a primitive
recursive tree Dϕ of search for the deduction of ϕ. If ϕ is a true formula, then Dϕ will have
a chain condition, i.e., it goes over automatically into the tree of deduction of ϕ, with the
height of Dϕ being smaller than ω
2 (for any true formula ϕ).
With a minor modification it is possible to obtain a similar result also for an ordinary
arithmetic system to which we adjoin an ω-rule, i.e., to each formula ϕ we assign a tree Dϕ
of deduction of ϕ in this system; for true arithmetic formulas the heights of their deduction
trees remain smaller than ω2. (p. 220)
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1.2.1 Recursive proofs using the recursive ω-rule
This subsection describes several accounts of first-order arithmetical truth. We need not endorse
these accounts in order to motivate the study of infinite sequences. The issues surrounding these
accounts are interesting enough in their own right and depend on mathematical facts about the
strength of infinitary proofs. We will raise a number of questions about these accounts of truth
in TA and our knowledge of TA.
Truth in TA
The system PAω2 is of particular interest because given any ϕ∈TA, there is a PAω2 -proof of ϕ
that is recursive (i.e., a PAω2 -proof which is encoded by a recursive function).
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There are several ways in which an account of truth in TA can employ the negation-
completeness of a system like PAω2 . For example, one such account, the recursive truth account
(RTA), can be stated as:
What it is for a first-order arithmetical sentence to be “true” is
for there to be a recursive PAω2 -proof of that sentence.
Note that RTA does not require that there be a single recursive function that encodes a
PAω2-proof of each sentence of TA. Instead, it suffices that for each sentence of TA, there is
some or other recursive function that encodes a PAω2 -proof of that sentence.
This kind of account analyzes a notion of truth in terms of a particular notion of proof. On
other views of mathematical truth, the fact that there is a proof of ϕ is to be explained — or
otherwise accounted for — in terms of the fact that ϕ is true. In contrast, RTA reverses the
direction of explanation. We take this to be a problem for RTA.
Mints (1991) writes that:
Belyakin [1967] obtained bounds in the completeness theorem for the recursive omega rule
for classical arithmetic by describing a (primitive recursive) canonical proof search tree TA
for any formula A and proving that if A is true, then TA is well-founded with ordinal length
less than ω2. (p. 404)
35 See Theorem 6.1.12 of Girard (1987, p. 356), from which we get that for each LA-sentence σ:
σ∈TA ⇐⇒ there is a recursive PAω-proof of σ.
Stronger still, each σ∈TA has a Ka´lmar-elementary proof tree of height ω · k(σ) in PAω, where k(σ)∈N
depends on the complexity of σ. See the method of proof of Theorem 8.2 in Takeuti (2013, pp. 41–45)
using reduction trees. Also see Lo´pez-Escobar (1967).
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1.2.2 Circularity
RTA is objectionably circular. The account claims that for each ϕ∈TA, the truth of ϕ consists
in the fact that
there is a recursive PAω2 -proof of ϕ.
As we will explain, each instance Φ of RTA’s analysans is itself equivalent to a sentence of TA
that expresses the fact that Φ. The truth of those LA-sentences must be accounted for too.
RTA purports to account for the truth of every sentence of TA. Thus, RTA must not help itself
to the truth of a sentence of TA. RTA takes for granted part of what it aims to account for.
We want to show that for each ϕ∈TA, there is a ϕ′∈TA that expresses the fact that there is
a recursive PAω2-proof of ϕ, and do so without running afoul of Tarski’s undefinability theorem.
Applied to LA, Tarski’s undefinability theorem states that:
There is no LA-formula ϕ(v1) such that for every LA-sentence σ,
N |= σ ⇐⇒ N |= ϕ(pσq).
Since the predicate
“is the code of an LA-sentence that is true in N”
is coextensive with the predicate
“is the code of an LA-sentence for which there is a recursive PAω2 -proof”,
by Tarski’s undefinability theorem, the latter predicate is not definable in N. But we will not
try to show that there is a single truth predicate for every LA-sentence, since there is no such
predicate. Rather, we will show that for each initial segment of the arithmetical hierarchy, there
is a truth predicate for that segment.
Note that for each n∈N, the notion of truth for Σn-sentences is definable in N. For each
n∈N, denote the theory that is like PA but restricts the induction schema to Σn-formulas by
IΣn.
36 For each n∈N, there is a Σn-formula SatΣn(v1, v2) such that for each LA-formula ϕ(v1),
IΣn `L ∀x
(
SatΣn
(
pϕ(y)q, x
) ↔ ϕ(x)).37
Then for each n∈N, there is an LA-formula TrΣn(v1) such that for each Σn-sentence σ,
N |= σ ⇐⇒ N |= TrΣn(pσq).
36 See Ha´jek & Pudla´k (2017, Chapter I).
37 See Kaye (1991, §9.3).
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Thus, for each n∈N, the set of codes of true Σn-sentences is definable in N.38
Now define a hierarchy of LA-theories, each closed under L. The zeroth theory is PA0ρ, which
is the same as PA.39 The next theory PA1ρ is like PA
0
ρ except that it allows proofs to use at most
one application of the recursive ω-rule. And so on for each finite ordinal. For each successor
ordinal α, PAα+1ρ is the closure under L of the union of PA
α
ρ with the set of those sentences
provable from PAαρ using exactly one application of the recursive ω-rule. For each limit ordinal
λ, PAλρ is the closure under L of the union of every PA
α
ρ for all α < λ. More precisely, define
PA0ρ := PA.
For each ordinal α, define
PAα+1ρ := the closure under L of the union of PA
α
ρ with
the set of all LA-sentences of the form ∀x ψ(x) for which both
(1) ∀n∈N ψ(n) ∈ PAαρ ,
and
(2) there is a unary total recursive function f such that
∀n∈N f(n) is the code of a PAαρ -proof of ψ(n).
For each limit ordinal λ, define
PAλρ := the closure under L of
⋃
α<λ
PAαρ .
Proposition: For each n∈N, there is an ordinal α < ω2 such that:40
(i) each true Σn-sentence has a recursive PA
α
ρ -proof,
(ii) each false Σn-sentence has a recursive PA
α
ρ -refutation,
and
(iii) #
[
PAαρ
]
is definable in N.
38 By Post’s Theorem, for each n ∈ N, ∃m > n such that the set of codes of true Σn-sentences is
definable in N by a Σm-formula.
39 The subscript in ‘PA0ρ’ refers to the recursive ω-rule.
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Define the function
µ : N −→ ω2
so that for each n∈N,
µ(n) := the least ordinal α such that
(i) each true Σn-sentence has a recursive PA
α
ρ -proof,
(ii) each false Σn-sentence has a recursive PA
α
ρ -refutation,
and
(iii) #
[
PAαρ
]
is definable in N.
Fix an n∈N and let ϕ be a true Σn-sentence that is not Σn−1. We want to show that there
is a true LA-sentence that expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAω2-proof of ϕ. We claim
that it suffices to show that for some m∈N, there is a true LA-sentence that expresses the fact
that
ϕ ∈ PAmρ .
By the proposition above,
#
[
PAµ(n)ρ
]
is definable in N. Let M(v1) be an LA-formula (depending on n) such that ∀x∈N,
N |= M(x) ⇐⇒ x ∈ #
[
PAµ(n)ρ
]
.
Then the sentence
ϕ′ := M(pϕq)
expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAµ(n)ρ -proof of ϕ. Thus, ϕ
′ expresses the fact that
there is a recursive PAω2-proof of ϕ.
41
Notice that from the statement that
40 Theorem 9 in Murawski (2006) is somewhat related, though it uses the unrestricted ω-rule.
41 This also shows that an account on which for each n∈N,
what it is for a Σn-sentence that is not Σn−1 to be “true” is
for there to be a recursive PA
µ(n)
ρ -proof of that sentence
is objectionably circular.
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ϕ′ expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAµ(n)ρ -proof of ϕ,
we inferred that
ϕ′ expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAω2 -proof of ϕ.
It does not in general follow from
(i) ϕ′ expresses the fact that P
and
(ii) P =⇒ Q
that
(iii) ϕ′ expresses the fact that Q.
But our inference above is unobjectionable because every PAµ(n)ρ -proof counts by definition as
a PAω2 -proof.
Here is another way to see the way in which RTA is circular. Let σ ∈ TA. Let σ′ be an
LA-sentence that expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAω2-proof of σ. RTA attempts to
account for the truth of σ in terms of the truth of σ′. But σ′ ∈TA, so RTA must also account
for the truth of σ′. It seems that this must continue ad infinitum.
There are proper subsets S of TA such that for each σ∈TA,
∃σ′∈S that expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAω2 -proof of σ.
For example, the sentence
0 = 0
is in TA, but that sentence does not express a fact about the existence of any PAω2 -proof,
recursive or not.
But this does not show that there is such a subset of TA that is deductively closed under L.
This motivates two questions.
Q3: Is there a proper subtheory T of TA such that for each σ∈TA,
T proves a sentence that expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAρ-ω-proof of σ?
Q4: Is there a proper subtheory T of TA such that for each σ∈TA,
T proves a sentence that expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAω2-proof of σ?
At best, RTA might be seen as reducing the problem of accounting for truth in TA to the
problem of accounting for truth in such an S ⊂ TA. But RTA is not an adequate account of
truth in any such S. And an account of the notion of truth in such an S that is in the spirit of
RTA would be circular. I.e., an account that claims that
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for a first-order arithmetical sentence to be “true in S” is
for there to be a recursive PAω2-proof of that sentence
is circular. Even though its analysans does not presuppose a notion of truth in TA, it presupposes
a notion of truth in S.
We have not formalized the notion of a fact.42 Nor have we formalized what it is for a
sentence to express a fact.43 Even so, we can raise a problem for RTA as follows. RTA must
account for the truth of every σ ∈TA. At stage 1, form S1 ⊂ TA as follows. For each σ ∈TA,
include in S1 the sentence that expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAω2-proof of σ. RTA
accounts for truth in TA by taking for granted the truth of each sentence in S1. But how is RTA
to account for the truth of each sentence of S1? At stage 2, form S2 ⊂ TA as follows. For each
σ∈S1, include in S2 the sentence that expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAω2 -proof of
σ. Now RTA accounts for the truth of the sentences in S1 by taking for granted the truth of
each sentence in S2. And so on ad infinitum.
More precisely, define
S0 := TA.
For each n∈N, define
Sn+1 :={
σ∈TA : ∃ψ∈Sn such that σ expresses the fact that there is a recursive PAω2-proof of ψ
}
.
Given our assumptions about the “expresses” relation that holds between certain sentences
and certain facts, each Si is countably infinite. This is because S0 is countably infinite, and each
Si+1 contains a unique sentence for each sentence in Si. This motivates asking:
Q5: Is it the case that ∀n,m∈N,
Sm ⊂ Sn ⇐⇒ n < m ?
When a sentence σ is in Si but not in Si+1, we can think of σ as being excluded at that stage
of the construction from those sentences the truth of which RTA must at that stage account for.
Whether a sentence can reappear after it is excluded is determined by the answer to Q3. But
42 For the purposes of thinking about accounting for truth in TA, we might choose a particular
language — e.g., that of third-order arithmetic — and choose a model of that language, and then take
each “fact” to correspond to a sentence (of that language) that is true in that model (of that language).
43 Each sentence should “express” at most one fact. We might also want each fact to be “expressed”
by at most one sentence. This can be done as follows. Partition the class of sentences into equivalence
classes under the relation of logical equivalence. From each equivalence class of sentences, choose a
canonical representative. Have some but not all of those canonical representatives “express” facts.
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that answer does not determine whether every sentence in TA is such that at some stage, it is
excluded. This motivates asking:
Q6: Which sentences are in ⋂
i∈N
Si ?
There is another problem with RTA. Each recursive PAω2-proof is coded by a unary total
recursive function, otherwise that proof would not be recursive. But given a unary total recursive
function f , not all consistent LA-theories prove a statement that expresses the fact that f is
total. Thus, RTA must either:
(i) presuppose a notion of truth in a consistent LA-theory T such that for each σ∈TA,
there is a total recursive function f that both codes a recursive PAω2-proof of σ
and is T -provably total, or
(ii) for each σ∈TA, presuppose a notion of truth in a consistent LA-theory T such that
there is a total recursive function f that both codes a recursive PAω2-proof of σ
and is T -provably total.
This is a problem for RTA because RTA must explain what it is for an arbitrary LA-sentence
to be true without presupposing a notion of truth in an LA-theory. An adequate account of
truth in TA must apply to every LA-sentence, including those sentences in such theories as those
mentioned in i, and those mentioned in ii.
We should also mention a possible objection to the motivational force of RTA. One might
worry that RTA fails to motivate the study of supertasks, on the following grounds. Given any
unary total recursive function f and any n∈N as input, only finitely many steps are required
in order to compute the value f(n). So one might think that no supertasks are required.
However, for many σ ∈ TA (including those σ that are sufficiently complex), every PAω2-
proof of σ that is encoded by a recursive function involves infinitely many applications of the
recursive ω-rule. Even though the function encoding an infinite proof of σ is recursive, verifying
the infinite proof encoded by that function requires performing infinitely many tasks, since each
one of infinitely many steps must be checked.
Infinite-length proofs are central to such an account of first-order arithmetical truth. There
are systems stronger than TA that prove sentences for which there is no “finitely specifiable”
proof (from that system’s axioms). Analogous accounts of truth in some of these theories can
be used to motivate the study of uncountable-length proofs and hypertasks.
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1.2.3 Knowledge of TA
Now we consider an account of our knowledge of first-order arithmetical truth. One such account
can be stated as:
first-order arithmetical truth is epistemically secured by our knowledge of
the fact that for each ϕ∈TA, there is a recursive PAω2-proof of ϕ.
If our knowledge of the existence of a recursive PAω2 -proof for each sentence of TA is sup-
posed to justify our knowledge of TA, one must ask what secures our knowledge of the former.
How much more secure is our knowledge of the existence of a recursive PAω2 -proof for each
sentence of TA as compared to our knowledge of TA? In particular:
How strong of a (natural) metatheory is needed to prove that
“each ϕ∈TA has a recursive PAω2 -proof”?
PA does not prove any statement that expresses the fact that “each ϕ∈TA has a recursive
PAω-proof”. Since the function defining the predicate “is the code of a sentence that has a
recursive PAω-proof” is not recursive, that function is not representable in PA. It is not the case
even that for each ϕ∈TA, PA proves a statement that expresses the fact that ϕ has a recursive
PAω2-proof.
One way of comparing our knowledge of the fact that “each ϕ ∈ TA has a recursive PAω2-
proof” with our knowledge of PA is to see how much transfinite induction must be added to PA
so that for each ϕ ∈ TA, the resulting system proves a statement that expresses the fact that
there is a recursive PAω2 -proof of ϕ.
44 This motivates asking:
Q7: What is the least ordinal α such that for each ϕ∈TA,
PA with induction up to α proves a statement that expresses the fact that
there is a recursive PAω2 -proof of ϕ?
It is natural to ask how the answer to Q7 changes when we relax the requirement that the
proof of ϕ have ordinal-height less than ω2. This motivates:
Q8: What is the least ordinal α such that for each ϕ∈TA,
PA with induction up to α proves a statement that expresses the fact that
there is a recursive PAρ-ω-proof of ϕ?
Another way of analyzing our knowledge of the fact that “each ϕ ∈ TA has a recursive
PAω2-proof” is given by reverse mathematics.
45 We can ask:
44 A canonical encoding of ordinals — in this case those less than 0 — can be obtained using Cantor
normal form.
45 See Simpson (2010).
35
Q9: What is the reverse-mathematical strength of a sentence that expresses the fact that
each ϕ∈TA has a recursive PAω2-proof?
Again we can relax the requirement that the proof of ϕ have ordinal-height less than ω2.
This motivates asking:
Q10: What is the reverse-mathematical strength of a sentence that expresses the fact that
each ϕ∈TA has a recursive PAρ-ω-proof?
Each of those facts might have more than one “natural” translation. But answers to questions
like these shed light on our knowledge of TA and its relation to our knowledge of the negation-
completeness of systems like PAω2 and PAρ-ω.
1.3 Effective prejudice
This section criticizes several arguments from Cotogno (2015) that can be seen as aiming against
accounts of first-order arithmetical truth that involve infinitary proofs. We can take Cotogno
to be arguing that no account of truth in TA in terms of infinite-length computations can
handle certain arithmetical sentences that are neither PA-provable nor PA-refutable. Cotogno’s
arguments rely on considerations about effectiveness and the ω-rule.
In the passages from Cotogno that we quote, we will add charitable clarifications, subscripts
and underlines as needed, enclosed in square brackets. Note that Cotogno sometimes uses
Tarski’s (1933) term “infinite induction” for the ω-rule, and other times he uses Rosser’s (1937)
term “Carnap’s rule” for the ω-rule.
Cotogno’s main point is that infinite sequences of computations cannot be used to decide
arbitrary arithmetical sentences. In his words:
. . . the undecidability of PA is not suppressed by infinite induction, in the general
case; even if physicists could design some actual infinity machine [that was capable
of completing ω-sequences of computations], one would still remain unable to reach
a decision on arbitrary [first-order] arithmetic sentences. (p. 281)
Cotogno explains that “the ω-rule does not cope with all [of the] objects entailing the unde-
cidability of PA” (p. 275). He writes:
. . . we shall criticize directly the assumption that [the] decidability of PA would
be secured by concluding a denumerable succession of operations in a finite span
of time. We shall observe that Go¨del’s and Rosser’s [PA-]unprovable sentences
remain undecidable even if the system allows infinite induction, as long as it is
consistent. A similar conclusion obtains by approaching undecidability through the
infinite succession of [PA-]unprovable sentences engendered by [one version of] the
Yablo paradox. (p. 277)
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Cotogno seems to be claiming that if PAω is consistent, then certain sentences which are
PAω-provable but not PA-provable are not decidable, even if we allow applications of the ω-rule.
In his words:
. . . the restoration of [negation-]completeness in PAω . . . does not amount by itself
to a restoration of decidability: it tells us what could be ideally grasped if we had
infinite operating capabilities, but [it] has no proper algorithmic content. (p. 277)
On Cotogno’s view, this is because:
. . . there is no way of ensuring [that] the ω-rule has sufficient generality to cope with
everything that can be expressed within universal systems; on the contrary, some
arithmetized constructions turn out to be refractory to ω instruments. (p. 278)
Background
In order to comment on Cotogno’s claims, we need to cover a bit of background.
Recall that the Church-Turing Thesis (CT) is the claim that
∀n∈N, every effectively computable total function from Nn+1 to N is total recursive.46
Assuming CT, the set of codes of the theorems of PAω is not effectively decidable, if PAω is
consistent. Since PAω’s provability relation is not recursive, if PAω is consistent then the set of
the codes of the theorems of PAω is not recursive either. By CT, if PAω is consistent, then there
is no effective procedure such that for each LA-sentence σ, it determines which one of
`PAω σ,
0PAω σ
holds. Under these assumptions, the set of codes of the theorems of PAω is not effectively
decidable.
What is at issue is whether every LA-sentence can be decidable by infinite sequences of
computations. Cotogno seems to be arguing that there are arithmetical sentences which could
not be decided even by those means. The next four subsections consider Cotogno’s arguments
in detail. In §1.3.5 we discuss the import of Cotogno’s main claims and arguments.
1.3.1 A Go¨del sentence for PA
Cotogno’s first argument is for the conclusion that the ω-rule would not help in defining an
infinite decision procedure for PA-provability. The argument uses one of PA’s Go¨del sentences
GPA. For each n∈N, Cotogno writes n for the numeral for n. We quote Cotogno (2015):
46 Several claims have been called a “Church-Turing Thesis”, but this one is most relevant for us.
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. . . [Kleene defines GPA as] ∀y ¬A(k, y), where A(x, y) = ProvPA(sub(x, pxq
[ · ]
, x), y)
and k is the numeral of k = p∀y ¬A(x, y)q (Kleene 1974[, p. 207]). A is the self-
referencing form of the [standard] proof predicate ProvPA, so G[PA] is asserting its
own [PA-]unprovability via k . . . The assumption under scrutiny is that the ω-rule
would cover all [of the] true [first-order] arithmetic sentences, including the ones that
are proven [to be PA-]undecidable. Go¨del . . . could not help viewing the semantic
part of the First [Incompleteness] Theorem — i.e., the conclusion that G[PA] is a
true sentence of PA — as a mental inference from the denumerable succession of
premisses
`[PA] ¬A([k], 0), `[PA] ¬A([k], 1), . . . , `[PA] ¬A([k], [n]), . . . (2)
to the universal sentence [N |=] ∀y ¬A(
[
k
]
, y), for all n ≥ 0 [sic] (Go¨del 1988, [p. 44,]
footnote 48[a]). Within PAω, one could think of generating all [of the] premisses [in]
(2), and then applying infinite induction to conclude `[PAω] G[PA]; this does make
sense, but the [PAω-]‘proof’ [of GPA] thus obtained remains a [merely] Platonic
entity, which cannot be turned into computational instructions. If it could, [then] it
would be represented by a Go¨del number g, so we would have `[PAω] A([k], [g]). Logic
then yields `[PAω] ∃bA([k], b), and then `[PAω] ¬∀b¬A([k], b), that is, `[PAω] ¬G[PA];
[but] this is contradicting `[PAω] G[PA] in PAω just as it does in PA . . . [The ω-rule
schema], in other words, is no syntactic rule. One may accept its meaning, but its
content is not captured by any finite string of symbols — the ‘. . . ’ used to write down
the ω-rule [schema] must be understood as an actually infinite sequence of dots, so
that no Go¨del number g could ever represent them. As long as Go¨del numbers are
a stylized expression of actual programs, there is no way [that] we could use infinite
induction to define a decision method [for `PA], even if we had an infinitely powerful
machine at our disposal. (p. 278)
PAω proves GPA
Before analyzing that passage, let us rehearse a proof that GPA is PAω-provable. Relative to
a given coding, for each n that codes an LA-wff, let Fn be the formula whose code is n. By
Kleene’s (1976, p. 206) lemma 21, there is a Go¨del numbering for LA-wffs and PA-proofs under
which there is an LA-predicate A(v1, v2) such that
y is the code of a PA-proof of Fx(x) =⇒ `PA A
(
x, y
)
,
y is not the code of a PA-proof of Fx(x) =⇒ `PA ¬A
(
x, y
)
.
With Cotogno, define
k := #
(∀y ¬A(x, y)).
Thus,
Fk(x) = ∀y ¬A(x, y).
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Define
GPA := Fk(k) = ∀y ¬A(k, y).
Assuming that PA is ω-consistent,47 by Kleene’s theorem 28 (pp. 207–208),
0PA GPA.
Then, ∀n∈N, n is not the code of a PA-proof of GPA. By ω applications of lemma 21,
∀n∈N `PA ¬A(k, n).
Thus,
∀n∈N `PAω ¬A(k, n).
By the ω-rule for PAω,
`PAω ∀y ¬A(k, y).
Thus,
`PAω GPA.
The set of codes of PAω-proofs
We can creatively extrapolate from the quoted passage of Cotogno (p. 278) the following argu-
ment. Assume that PAω is consistent. Suppose for reductio that the relation “being the code
of a PAω-proof” is recursive. Since every recursive relation is numeralwise expressible in PA,
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and every relation that is numeralwise expressible in PA is numeralwise expressible in PAω too,
there is a coding of PAω-proofs (and LA-wffs) under which ∀x, y∈N:
y is the code of a PAω-proof of Fx(x) =⇒ `PAω A
(
x, y
)
,
y is not the code of a PAω-proof of Fx(x) =⇒ `PAω ¬A
(
x, y
)
.
Let g be the code of a PAω-proof of GPA. Thus,
47 An LA-theory T is ω-consistent iff for every LA-wff ϕ(v1),
∀n∈N `T ϕ(n) =⇒ 0T ∃x ¬ϕ(x).
T is ω-inconsistent iff it is not ω-consistent.
48 See Corollary 3.25 in Mendelson (2015, p. 191).
39
`PAω A
(
k, g
)
,
`PAω ∃bA(k, b),
`PAω ¬∀b¬A(k, b),
`PAω ¬GPA,
`PAω ¬GPA ∧ GPA.
Thus PAω is inconsistent. But we assumed the consistency of PAω. Contradiction. By
reductio, the relation “being the code of a PAω-proof” is not recursive. So if PAω is consistent,
then the relation “being the code of a PAω-proof” is not recursive. Here ends the extrapolated
argument.
Since there are uncountably many PAω-proofs, the conclusion of the extrapolated argument
should not be surprising. By Goldfarb’s (1975) result, GPA is provable in PAω2 too, so we can
give an argument using PAω2 that is analogous to the one that we extrapolated.
The set of codes of PAω2-proofs
Here is a creative extrapolation of a slightly more interesting argument from the same quoted
passage. Assume that PAω2 is consistent. Suppose for reductio that “being the code of a PAω2-
proof” is a recursive relation. Since every recursive relation is numeralwise expressible in PA,
there is a coding of PAω2 -proofs (and LA-wffs) under which ∀x, y∈N:
y is the code of a PAω2-proof of Fx(x) =⇒ `PA A
(
x, y
)
,
y is not the code of a PAω2-proof of Fx(x) =⇒ `PA ¬A
(
x, y
)
.
Following Cotogno, let g be the code of a PAω2 -proof of GPA. Thus,
`PA A
(
k, g
)
.
Since (as shown previously)
∀n∈N `PA ¬A(k, n),
and in particular
`PA ¬A
(
k, g
)
.
So
`PA ¬A
(
k, g
) ∧ A(k, g).
Thus, PA is inconsistent. So PAω2 is inconsistent. But we assumed the consistency of PAω2 .
Contradiction. By reductio, the relation “being the code of a PAω2-proof” is not recursive. So
if PAω2 is consistent, then the relation “being the code of a PAω2 -proof” is not recursive.
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1.3.2 A Rosser sentence for PA
Cotogno’s second argument uses a Rosser sentence RPA for PA:
Rosser’s construction [of RPA] hinges on the refutation predicate RefPA(x, y), where
y is [the numeral for] the Go¨del number of a formal [PA-]proof of the negation of the
sentence . . . [whose] Go¨del number is [indicated by the numeral] x. The construction
starts from the open formula ∀y (A(x, y)→ [∃z] (z ≤ y ∧ B(x, z))), of Go¨del number
h, where [the] predicate B(x, y) = RefPA(sub(x, pxq
[ · ]
, x), y) is the dual of A(x, y) for
refutation. Then, replacing the free variable x with the numeral [for] h produces the
self-referencing sentence R[PA] = ∀y (A(h, y) → ∃z (z ≤ y ∧ B(h, z))) . . .
. . . [To show that 0PA RPA,] one assumes `PA R[PA]; therefore, for some [integer]
v > 0 `PA A(h, [v]). Consistency [of PA] then ensures that exactly v non-refutation
theorems are provable [in PA]:
`PA ¬B([h], 0), . . . , `PA ¬B([h], [v]) (3)
These yield `PA ∀c (c ≤ [v]→ ¬B(h, c)); by the hypothesis, then, we have:
`PA ∃b (A(h, b) ∧ ¬∃c (c ≤ b ∧B(h, c))). Next, logic yields
`PA ∃b¬(¬A(h, b) ∨ ∃c (c ≤ b ∧B(h, c))) and [then]
`PA ¬∀b (¬A(h, b) ∨ ∃c (c ≤ b ∧ B(h, c))). The last proposition actually amounts
to `PA ¬R[PA], against the hypothesis; hence, 0PA R[PA]. An analogous argument
then shows 0PA ¬R[PA]. Since succession (3) contains in any case a finite number of
sentences, it cannot be generalized; unlike succession (2), it is indifferent to infinite
induction.
R[PA] states that [the existence of] a [numeral for the code of a PA-]proof of itself
entails [that there is] a shorter [numeral for the code of a PA-]refutation [of itself].
. . . In this case as well [as with succession (2)], an infinity of premisses
`[PA] A(h,
[
y
]
) → ∃z (z ≤
[
y
]
∧ B(h, z)) (4)
for all y ≥ 0 could [be used to] prove [in PAω] that R[PA] is a true sentence . . . Such
[a] ‘proof’, however, could not be formalized in PAω; otherwise, it would have its
own Go¨del number, and that would lead again to a contradiction. (pp. 278–279)
We take Cotogno to be arguing by reductio that there could not be a recursive coding of
PAω-proofs. The more interesting argument is about PAω2 (rather than PAω). But before giving
that argument, let us show that RPA is PAω2-provable.
PAω2 proves RPA
By Kleene’s lemma 21, there is a Go¨del numbering for LA-wffs and PA-proofs under which there
is an LA-predicate B(v1, v2) such that
41
y is the code of a PA-proof of ¬Fx(x) =⇒ `PA B
(
x, y
)
,
y is not the code of a PA-proof of ¬Fx(x) =⇒ `PA ¬B
(
x, y
)
.
With Cotogno, define
h := #
(
∀y (A(x, y) → ∃z ≤ y B(x, z))).49
Thus,
Fh(x) = ∀y
(
A(x, y) → ∃z ≤ y B(x, z)).
Define
RPA := Fh(h) = ∀y
(
A(h, y) → ∃z ≤ y B(h, z)).
Assuming that PA is consistent, by Kleene’s theorem 29 (p. 208),
0PA RPA.
So, ∀y∈N, y is not the code of a PA-proof of RPA. By ω applications of Kleene’s lemma 21,
∀y∈N `PA ¬A
(
h, y
)
.
So for any LA-wff ϕ(v1),
∀y∈N `PA A
(
h, y
) → ϕ(y).
Taking
ϕ(y) = ∃z ≤ y B(h, z),
we get
∀y∈N `PA A
(
h, y
) → ∃z ≤ y B(h, z).
Then
∀y∈N `PAω A
(
h, y
) → ∃z ≤ y B(h, z).
By the ω-rule for PAω,
`PAω ∀y
(
A(h, y) → ∃z ≤ y B(h, z)).
So
`PAω RPA.
By Goldfarb’s (1975) result,
`PAω2 RPA.
49 Because of the bounded quantifier, an abbreviation of an LA-wff occurs in that string.
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The set of codes of PAω2-proofs
We can creatively extrapolate from the quoted passage of Cotogno (pp. 278–279) the following
argument. Assume that PAω2 is consistent. Suppose for reductio that the relation “being the
code of a PAω2-proof” is recursive. Since every recursive relation is numeralwise expressible in
PA, there is a coding of PAω2 -proofs (and LA-wffs) under which ∀x, y∈N:
y is the code of a PAω2-proof of Fx(x) =⇒ `PA A
(
x, y
)
,
y is not the code of a PAω2-proof of Fx(x) =⇒ `PA ¬A
(
x, y
)
.
Let r be the code of a PAω2 -proof of RPA. Thus,
`PA A(h, r).
Since (as shown previously)
∀y∈N `PA ¬A
(
h, y
)
,
we have
`PA ¬A(h, r).
So
`PA ¬A(h, r) ∧ A(h, r).
Thus, PA is inconsistent. So PAω2 is inconsistent. Contradiction. By reductio, the relation
“being the code of a PAω2-proof” is not recursive. So if PAω2 is consistent, then the relation
“being the code of a PAω2-proof” is not recursive.
This is the best that we can do to fill in the line of reasoning that Cotogno suggests can be
given using RPA.
1.3.3 A consistency statement for PA
Many LA-sentences express the consistency of PA, and many sentences are PA-provably equiva-
lent to ones that do so. Cotogno suggests that an argument that is analogous to the one using
RPA can be given using an LA-sentence ConPA that expresses the consistency of PA.
PAω . . . might well take care of typical [LA-]sentences [that are] undecidable in PA,
such as the statement of Fermat’s Last Theorem, but [PAω] has nothing more than
the original PA [has] for deciding odd specimens such as G[PA] or R[PA], if [Peano]
arithmetic is consistent.
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Rosser (1937) admitted that PAω can prove the consistency of PA: the Carnap
rule would draw the consistency sentence ConPA from infinitely many premisses of
[the] form ¬RefPA(paxPAq, n), where axPA are the Peano axioms. Formalizing this
argument and representing it by a Go¨del number is, however, prevented by Go¨del[’s]
Second [Incompleteness] Theorem; again, all premises are required in actu. (p. 279)
Perhaps Cotogno has in mind an ω-sequence of LA-sentences which are equivalent to:
it is not the case that 0 is the code of a PA-refutation of PA’s axioms,
...
it is not the case that n is the code of a PA-refutation of PA’s axioms,
...
Part of the claim would need to be that each of these statements is equivalent to a PA-provable
sentence, and that the universal generalization
∀n∈N, it is not the case that n is the code of a PA-refutation of PA’s axioms
is expressed by a sentence that is PAω-provable.
Cotogno’s argument seems to aim at showing that a particular PAω-proof of ConPA cannot
be encoded by a natural number. It is not clear how to make sense of
paxPAq,
since the axioms of PA are countably infinite in number, and PA is not finitely axiomatizable.
But Cotogno’s argument is easily fixed to avoid this problem.
Take
ConPA := ∀x ¬A
(
p0 6=0q, x).
PAω proves ConPA
First we show that ConPA is PAω-provable. For each natural number, PA proves that that
number is not the code of a PA-proof of the sentence
0 6=0.
I.e.,
∀n∈N `PA ¬A
(
p0 6=0q, n).
Since PAω has the ω-rule,
`PAω ∀x ¬A
(
p0 6=0q, x).
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Cotogno’s argument using ConPA
Cotogno’s argument might go as follows. If this PAω-proof of ConPA “could be formalized”, then
it would have a Go¨del number. Suppose that k is the code of a PAω-proof of ConPA. Then
`PA A
(
pConPAq, k
)
.
Thus, `PA ConPA. By the second incompleteness theorem, PA is inconsistent. But by assump-
tion, PA is consistent. Contradiction. So no natural number codes a PAω-proof of ConPA.
This is the best that we can do to fill in the line of reasoning using ConPA.
1.3.4 A Yablo sequence for PA
Cotogno’s third argument uses an ω-sequence of LA-sentences:50
ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕi, . . . (5)
where each instance ϕi, for any i ≥ 0, is a ∆1 sentence stating that all [of] its
successors [in (5)] are [PA-]refutable: ϕi = ∀j (j > [i] → ∃z RefPA(pϕjq
[ · ]
, z)) . . .
Proposition 2 If PA is ω-consistent, then [each of the] sentences in [the] succession
[in] Eq. 5 are undecidable [in PA].
. . . First, let us assume `PA ϕi, where ϕi is an arbitrary member of (5), [with] i ≥ 0:
by [PA’s] ω-consistency, each existential clause ∃j (j >
[
i
]
→ ∃z RefPA(pϕjq
[ · ]
, z))
should be satisfied by some integer, so we may assert `PA ¬ϕj for all j > i. Then,
let us consider the subsequent sentence ϕi+1: all [of] its successors [in (5)] are [PA-]
refutable, and this yields `PA ϕi+1, a contradiction.
Conversely, let us assume `PA ¬ϕi, [for some] i ≥ 0. We are thus assuming that
∃j ¬(j >
[
i
]
→ ∃z RefPA(pϕjq
[ · ]
, z)) is [PA-]proven; logic turns this into
∃j (j >
[
i
]
∧ ∀z ¬RefPA(pϕjq
[ · ]
, z)). In other words, we are holding that no integer
z codes a [PA-]refutation of ϕj for some j > i; since PA is assumed [to be] ω-
consistent, this can count as a proof by enumeration of ϕj . A contradiction then
obtains again for ϕj+1, by repeating the first part of the argument. . .
In this case as well, we can see that undecidability is not eliminated by PAω: each
sentence ϕi is by definition [a] universal [generalization], and [is] therefore indifferent
to infinite induction. Even if one could sweep [through] the whole [sequence in] (5)
in a single pass, that would make no difference for deciding each ϕi; undecidability is
a built-in aspect of the succession [in (5)], and is not affected by the way [in which]
one scans its elements — be it one at the time, or all of them in [a] batch. (p. 280)
The second half of Cotogno’s argument for proposition 2 fails. There he needs to show that
50 The sequence is structurally related to a version of Yablo’s paradox. See Cook (2014).
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∀n∈N 0PA ¬ϕn.
He fixes an i∈N and assumes for reductio that
`PA ¬ϕi.
It then follows from his definitions that
`PA ∃j > i ∀z ¬RefPA
(
˙pϕjq, z
)
.
Then we have that for some fixed integer j > i,
`PA ∀z ¬RefPA
(
pϕjq, z
)
.
Here Cotogno claims that since PA is ω-consistent, “this can count as a proof by enumeration
of ϕj”, i.e.,
`PA ϕj .
PA’s ω-consistency cannot help at this point in the reasoning. The sentence
∀z ¬RefPA
(
pϕjq, z
)
is PA-provably equivalent to an LA-sentence expressing the consistency of PA. If PA cannot
refute ϕj , then it cannot prove ¬ϕj , so it cannot prove 0 6= 0. If PA could prove 0 6= 0, then it
could prove any LA-formula, including ¬ϕj . So
`PA ∀z ¬RefPA
(
pϕjq, z
)
=⇒ `PA ConPA.
Then by the second incompleteness theorem, PA is inconsistent and therefore ω-inconsistent.
By reductio, PA does not prove ϕj . This would be one way to finish the proof of proposition 2.
Part of what is causing trouble is the definition of sequence 5. Let us explain a way that the
intended sequence can be defined correctly.
A sequence of Yablo sentences for PA
Following Kurahashi (2014), provided that a PA-provability predicate
PrPA(v1) := ∃y PrfPA(v1, y),
PrfPA(v1, v2) is a standard proof predicate for PA iff for any LA-wffs ϕ(v1) and ψ(v1):
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(i) PrfPA represents in PA a primitive recursive subset of ω×ω,
(ii) `PA ϕ(x) ⇐⇒ PrPA
(
pϕ(x˙)q
) ∈ TA,
(iii) `PA ϕ(x) =⇒ `PA PrPA
(
pϕ(x˙)q
)
,
(iv) `PA PrPA
(
pϕ(x˙)→ ψ(x˙)q) → (PrPA(pϕ(x˙)q)→ PrPA(pψ(x˙)q)),
(v) ϕ(x) is a Σ1-formula =⇒ `PA ϕ(x)→ PrPA
(
pϕ(x˙)q
)
.
An LA-wff Y (v1) is a Yablo formula of PA iff
for some standard proof predicate PrPA(v1) for PA,
`PA ∀n
(
Y (n) ↔ ∀m > n ¬PrPA
(
pY (m˙)q
))
.
We can correctly define the sequence that Cotogno intended by (5) by using an instance of
the fixed point lemma. Kurahashi’s lemma 2 (p. 1002) states:
For each LA-wff ϕ(v1, v2, v3),
we can effectively find an LA-wff ψ(v1) such that
`PA ∀x
(
ψ(x) ↔ ∀y ϕ(x, y, pψ(y˙)q)).
Taking
ϕ(x, j, u) :=
j > x → ∃z RefPA(u, z),
there is an LA-wff Y (v1) such that
`PA ∀x
(
Y (x) ↔ ∀j > x ∃z RefPA
(
pY ˙(j)q, z
))
.
For each i∈N define
ϕi := Y (i).
For each i∈N, ϕi is PA-provably equivalent to
∀j > i ∃z RefPA
(
pY (j˙)q, z
)
.
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It is not the case that each ϕi is numerically identical to the corresponding instance of that
formula, as Cotogno suggests. Thus we have the ω-sequence of Yablo sentences for PA
Y (0), Y (1), Y (2), . . . , Y (n), . . . (5′)
each of which expresses the claim that each of its successors in that sequence is PA-refutable.
PA neither proves nor refutes any of these Yablo sentences
Let us show that each sentence in that sequence is neither PA-provable nor PA-refutable. First
we show that if PA is consistent, then PA does not prove any sentence in 5′. Suppose for reductio
that
∃x∈N `PA Y (x).
Fix an i∈N such that
`PA Y (i).
By Kurahashi’s lemma 2,
`PA Y (i) ↔ ∀j > i ∃z RefPA
(
pY (j˙)q, z
)
.
So
`PA ∀j > i ∃z RefPA
(
pY (j˙)q, z
)
.
But then
`PA ∀j > i+ 1 ∃z RefPA
(
pY (j˙)q, z
)
.
By Kurahashi’s lemma 2,
`PA Y (i+ 1) ↔ ∀j > i+ 1 ∃z RefPA
(
pY (j˙)q, z
)
.
So
`PA Y (i+ 1).
Since
`PA ∀j > i ∃z RefPA
(
pY (j˙)q, z
)
(as shown earlier), we have
48
`PA ∃z RefPA
(
pY (i+ 1)q, z
)
.
Thus,
`PA ¬Y (i+ 1).
So
`PA ¬Y (i+ 1) ∧ Y (i+ 1).
So PA is inconsistent, which contradicts our assumption that it was consistent. Therefore,
∀x∈N 0PA Y (x).
Next we show that PA does not disprove any sentence in 5′. Suppose for reductio that
∃x∈N `PA ¬Y (x).
Let i∈N be such that
`PA ¬Y (i).
Since Y (i) is a Yablo formula of PA, there is a standard proof predicate PrPA(v1) for PA
such that
`PA ¬Y (i) ↔ ¬∀m > i ¬PrPA
(
pY (m˙)q
)
.
So
`PA ¬∀m > i ¬PrPA
(
pY (m˙)q
)
.
Then
`PA ∃m > i PrPA
(
pY (m˙)q
)
.
Since
∃m > i PrPA
(
pY (m˙)q
)
is equivalent to a Σ1-forumla, and PA is Σ1-sound,
∃m∈N `PA PrPA
(
pY (m)q
)
.
Since PrPA is a standard proof predicate for PA,
∃m∈N `PA Y (m).
This contradicts the conclusion of the previous reductio argument. Therefore,
∀n∈N 0PA ¬Y (n).
Thus, no sentence in sequence 5′ is PA-provable or PA-refutable.
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PAω refutes each of these Yablo sentences
Cotogno (2015, p. 279) claims that each of these Yablo sentences is “indifferent to infinite
induction”, i.e., the ω-rule. Since PAω proves every LA-sentence that is true in N, it should not
be surprising that PAω refutes each of these Yablo sentences. We will show that the negation of
each ϕi is PAω-provable, i.e.,
∀n∈N `PAω ¬Y (n).
Work backwards. Fix an integer i∈N. We need to show that
`PAω ¬∀j
(
j > i → ∃z RefPA
(
pY (j˙)q, z
))
.
This is equivalent to
`PAω ∃j
(
j > i ∧ ¬∃z RefPA
(
pY (j˙)q, z
))
.
It suffices to show that for some integer j > i,
`PAω ¬∃z RefPA
(
pY
(
j
)
q, z
)
.
This is equivalent to showing that for some integer j > i,
`PAω ∀z ¬RefPA
(
pY
(
j
)
q, z
)
.
Thus, it suffices to show that for some integer j > i,
`PAω ∀z ¬PrfPA
(
p¬Y (j)q, z).
Thus, it would suffice to show that for some integer j > i, each of the following hold:
`PAω ¬PrfPA
(
p¬Y (j)q, 0)
`PAω ¬PrfPA
(
p¬Y (j)q, 1)
...
`PAω ¬PrfPA
(
p¬Y (j)q, n)
...

(∗)
Now work forwards. For any j∈N, each x∈N is such that PA proves that x is not the code
of a PA-proof of ¬Y (j). Thus, for some integer j > i,
∀n∈N `PA ¬PrfPA
(
p¬Y (j)q, n).
So we have that for some integer j > i,
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∀n∈N `PAω ¬PrfPA
(
p¬Y (j)q, n).
This gives us each of the statements in the sequence * above. Therefore,
∀n∈N `PAω ¬Y (n).
This is what we wanted to show. Notice that it follows that
`PAω ∀x ¬Y (x).
1.3.5 The import of effectiveness
This subsection briefly discusses the importance of considerations about effectiveness to accounts
of truth in TA that involve infinitary notions of proof.
Recall that Cotogno’s first three arguments respectively use GPA, RPA, and ConPA. Let Ψ
be any LA-sentence such that
0PA Ψ but `PAω Ψ.
Cotogno might give analogous arguments for the conclusion that Ψ cannot be decided by an
infinite sequence of compuations.
A crucial step in those arguments is the conditional claim that
if a PAω-proof of Ψ could be turned into computational instructions,
then that proof would have a Go¨del number.
We can make some sense of Cotogno’s reasoning that aims to show that no PAω-proof of Ψ has
a Go¨del number. Though that conclusion can be established by simpler reasoning.
If we allow computational instructions to require performing a supertask, then a PAω-proof
of Ψ can be turned into computational instructions. This is shown by the fact that there is a
recursive PAω2-proof of Ψ. This means that there is an infinitary proof of Ψ, from the axioms
of PA, using fewer than ω2 applications of the recursive ω-rule, and this proof can be coded by
a unary total recursive function. Thus, if we were given an LA-sentence σ (or its code), and
we were given the index of a unary total recursive function f , and we had a countably infinite
reserve of memory, then a countable sequence of computations (i.e., a supertask) would allow
us to verify whether f in fact codes a recursive PAω2-proof of σ.
Of course, this does not require there to be an effective method for deciding, of any given
LA-sentence σ, whether there is a recursive PAω2-proof of σ. Assuming CT, this is ruled out
by syntactic forms of the first incompleteness theorem. The set of codes of LA-sentences that
are PAω-provable is not recursive or even recursively enumerable. Assuming CT, nor is there an
effective method such that given any LA-sentence σ,
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if σ ∈ TA, then it produces the code of a PAω-proof of σ,
if σ /∈ TA, then it produces the code of a PAω-proof of ¬σ.
We do not see how to make sense of Cotogno’s arguments in a way that supports his claim
that supertasks would not allow one to decide arbitrary LA-sentences. The fact that the set
of codes of PAω2-proofs is not recursive does not threaten accounts of truth in TA such as
RTA, which claims that the “truth” of an LA-sentence ϕ consists in the existence of a recursive
PAω2-proof of ϕ. Accounts like RTA have serious problems, but this is not one of them.
1.4 Arithmetical truth beyond LA
PAω2 suffices for capturing TA. In principle, any sentence of first-order arithmetic can be
(dis)proven by a countable sequence of computations.51 Thus, one way of understanding the
notion of first-order arithmetical truth is in terms of possible supertasks. Even if this is not a
tenable philosophical account of truth in TA, it is at least an extensionally adequate character-
ization of TA.
But TA falls far short of arithmetical truth proper. If there are truths of arithmetic that are
not expressible in LA, then TA does not exhaust arithmetical truth, and ‘true arithmetic’ is a
misleading term for TA. There are only countably many LA-sentences, so TA is only countably
infinite. For example, if for each non-recursive S ⊂ N there is a distinct true arithmetical
statement (in an infinitary or higher-order language) about S, then there are uncountably many
truths (expressible in that language) about arithmetic. TA only captures countably many of
those truths.
A similar point can be made about PA’s first-order induction schema, which gives an induc-
tion axiom for each LA-predicate. The set of all such predicates is only countably infinite, but
there are uncountably many subsets of N to which induction ought to apply. PA’s first order
induction schema only applies to those (countably many) subsets of N that are definable by
LA-formulas. This gives another reason to look at theories beyond PA, languages beyond LA,
and logics beyond L.
1.5 Mathematical constructions
This section argues that if ZFC is consistent, then performing hypertasks is compatible with the
truths of ZFC. This point is rather modest, because (if ZFC is consistent, then) a wide variety
of propositions are compatible with the truths of ZFC.
51 #
[
TA
]
is Σ11, as is the set of codes of false LA-sentences. See Theorem IV.1.14 in Odifreddi (1992).
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Certain mathematical constructions can be seen as involving infinite sequences of tasks. For
example, the axiom of countable choice states that for each countable family F of non-empty
sets, there is a “choice” function
C : F −→
⋃
F
for which
∀S∈F C(S) ∈ S.
I.e., for any such F , there is a “choice” function that maps each S ∈ F to an element of S.
Mormann (2010) writes that the axiom of countable choice, which he calls “CAC”,
. . . may be reformulated as the assertion that the “ideal mathematical agent” Mat
has the capacity of carrying out supertasks of the following kind: Given a countable
family F = {S1, S2, . . .} of nonempty sets, let si be the task of choosing an element
from Si. Then the countable axiom of choice asserts that Mat . . . is able to perform
the totality of the countably many tasks si in a finite time. To be specific, one may
assume that Mat works in a similar fashion as Achilles in that he needs for the first
choice s1 the time s (s = [1] second), for the second choice s2 the time
1
2s, for the
third choice s3 the time
1
4s, and so on. Thereby, the construction of a choice function
. . . can be conceived [of] as [a] supertask that is carried out in 2 seconds. Something
like this is assumed, at least implicitly, when “real mathematicians” invoke (CAC) in
their proofs which are thought to be carried out in a finite amount of time. Using
(CAC) they feel entitled to the contention of having available a choice function C for
any countable family F of non-empty sets. Analogously, the general axiom of choice
(AC) may be conceived [of] as the assertion that the “hypertasks” of constructing
choice functions for arbitrary families F of nonempty sets in a finite amount of time
are possible. (pp. 3–4)
The axiom of global choice (GC) states that every class of non-empty sets has a (class-sized)
choice function. Analogously, GC may be seen as allowing ultratasks.
We have seen that one way of understanding TA is in terms of possible supertasks. The
cumulative hierarchy can be understood in terms of sequences of tasks too. Specifically, each
set can be thought of as the result of a sequence of stages of set-formation, as in the iterative
conception of the universe of sets.
Potter (2004) mentions the connection between well-ordered hypertasks and the (possible)
structure of time:52
When we discussed the constructivist understanding of the process of set formation,
we noted the difficulty that this conception would apparently limit us to finite sets. In
52 Potter nonstandardly uses the term “supertask” to mean any well-ordered infinite sequence of
tasks, whether countable or not.
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order to liberate the constructivist from this limitation, we examined the possibility
of appealing to supertasks — processes carried out repeatedly with increasing speed,
so that an infinite number may be carried out within a finite period of time. The
proposition . . . [that every well-ordered subset of the real line is countable] shows,
however, that this method has a limit. This is because the tasks performed in a
supertask are well-ordered in time. As a result, if we assume that the ordering
of time is correctly modelled as a continuum [i.e., like the real number system as
treated in classical mathematics], we can conclude that any supertask contains only
countably many subtasks. (p. 177)
It is not clear why a constructivist appeal in this context to infinite sequences of tasks must
assume that time is structured like R, or some other linear continuum that would be incompatible
with completing a hypertask in a finite length of time. There are linear continua other than
R such that possible worlds in which time is structured like one of those continua allow for
well-ordered hypertasks to be completed in a finite length of time. For example, it has been
argued that one such continuum is the surreal number line.53 A possible world with surreal time
allows for ultratasks to be completed in any non-trivial interval of time.
1.5.1 Possibility relative to a consistent system
Given a consistent (semi-)formal system, we can define a notion of modality under which what is
“possible” (relative to that system) is whatever is “compatible with” that system. For example,
we can define what is possible with respect to L as follows.
Say that a proposition p is L-possible iff
p is compatible with the truths of L.
Likewise, we can define what is possible with respect to ZFC.
Say that a proposition p is ZFC-possible iff
p is compatible with the truths of ZFC.
ZFC-possibility is stricter than L-possibility. Not every L-possible proposition is ZFC-possible.
For example, the sentence
0 ∈ 0
expresses a proposition that is L-possible. But that proposition is not ZFC-possible — in ZFC,
the ∈-relation is irreflexive.54
53 See Al-Dhalimy & Geyer (2016).
54 Similarly, the sentence “0 < 0” expresses a proposition that is L-possible but not compatible with
the truths of classical mathematics.
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What is it for a proposition to be “compatible with” the truths of ZFC? This notion can be
characterized syntactically roughly as follows. Suppose that a sentence s expresses a proposition
p. Form a new language by expanding the language of ZFC to include the basic notions used in
s. Then, p is compatible with the truths of ZFC iff
ZFC+s does not prove a contradiction (using L) in the new language.
I.e., ZFC is consistent with s (under L).
If a system S is inconsistent, then no proposition is S-possible. So any claim that a propo-
sition is ZFC-possible should be preceded by (something that is equivalent to) the assumption
that ZFC is consistent. We will omit this qualification from here on.
1.6 Hypertasks
This section argues that performing a hypertask is ZFC-possible. In particular, we will consider
the hypertask of “listing” the real numbers.
Cantor’s theorem implies that for any set S, there is no surjection from S to P(S).55 A
special case of this is that there is no surjection from N to R, or from ω to 2ω.56 One might
think that since R is uncountable, the reals cannot be listed — i.e., it is not possible to enumerate
all of them in a finite length of time. We think otherwise. Although the reals cannot be listed
in an ω-length sequence (one by one), an infinite list need not have order type ω, or even a
countable order type.
For time to be structured in a way that is compatible with performing a hypertask, a finite
length of time must contain uncountably many non-trivial pairwise non-overlapping subintervals.
Premise 1: It is ZFC-possible for a finite length of time to contain
an ω1-sequence of non-trivial pairwise non-overlapping subintervals.
57
55 Lawvere’s fixed point theorem generalizes various diagonalization theorems. See Karimi & Salehi
(2017).
56 Recall that 2ω is the set of all total functions from ω to {0, 1}.
57 We are only considering one-dimensional structures for time. A one-dimensional topological space
T satisfies the countable chain condition iff every collection of pairwise disjoint non-empty open subsets
of T is countable. See Jech (2006, Chapter 4).
Premise 1 implies that
it is ZFC-possible for time not to be structured like
a one-dimensional topological space that satisfies the countable chain condition.
Under the order topology, R satisfies the countable chain condition. So Premise 1 implies that
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By premise 1, let I be a finite-length temporal interval that contains, for each ordinal α < ω1,
a non-trivial subinterval Iα, with these subintervals being pairwise non-overlapping, and for any
ordinals α, β such that
α < β < ω1,
Iα temporally precedes Iβ .
Assuming that ZF is consistent, the continuum hypothesis (CH) is ZFC-possible.58 ZF+CH
proves that there is a bijection between ω1 and R.
Premise 2: It is ZFC-possible that there is a bijection between ω1 and R.
Let such a bijection be
f : ω1 −→ R.
The third premise concerns subdividing intervals of time. Listing a real number amounts
to an ω-task, e.g., listing each digit in the binary decimal expansion of that real. If time were
dense, then any non-trivial interval of time would contain an ω-sequence of non-trivial, pairwise
non-overlapping subintervals, and an ω-task could be done in any non-trivial interval of time.
Premise 3: It is ZFC-possible to list any real number in any non-trivial interval of time.
The possibilities mentioned in premisses 1–3 are jointly compatible with the truths of ZFC.
Premise 4: The possibilities mentioned in premisses 1–3 are jointly ZFC-compossible.
it is ZFC-possible for time not to be structured like
R under the order topology.
Since every topological space that is separable satisfies the countable chain condition, Premise 1 also
implies that
it is ZFC-possible for time not to be structured like
a one-dimensional topological space that is separable.
Assuming ZFC, there are many one-dimensional Hausdorff spaces H that can be equipped with an
appropriate notion of distance such that a finite-length interval of H contains uncountably many non-
trivial pairwise non-overlapping subintervals. Something similar can be done using locales.
58 ZFC+GCH is consistent relative to ZF.
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For each ordinal α < ω1, during Iα, list the real number f(α). Thus, each real can be listed
during I. So, it is ZFC-possible for there to be a “listing” of all real numbers — a listing in which
each real is preceded by only countably many others in the listing — and for an “enumeration”
of all the reals to occur within a finite length of time.
Conclusion: It is ZFC-possible to list the reals.
It is not essential to this kind of argument that we use ω1, but that is the simplest case. If
it is ZFC-possible that there is an ordinal α such that both
(i) there is a bijection between α and R,
and
(ii) a finite-length interval of time contains an α-sequence of
non-trivial pairwise non-overlapping subintervals,
and this is ZFC-compossible with it being the case that any real number can be listed during
any non-trivial interval of time, then listing the reals in a finite length of time is ZFC-possible.
The argument can be strengthened to apply regardless of the cardinality of R. Let κ be
whichever cardinal is such that
2ℵ0 = κ.59
59 ZFC places only very weak restrictions on the value of 2ℵ0 . Let S be a class linearly ordered by <.
Recall that s ⊆ S is cofinal in S iff
∀x∈S ∃y∈s y > x.
When the axiom of choice (AC) holds, the cofinality of a class S, written cf(S), is the least cardinal κ
such that there is a κ-sized subset of S that is cofinal in S. By the Zermelo-Ko¨nig inequality, when AC
holds, every cardinal κ is such that
cf(2κ) > κ.
Recall that a cardinal is regular iff it is a fixed-point of the cofinality function cf . Easton (1970)
showed that there are many ordinals α for which it is consistent relative to ZFC that
2ℵ0 = ℵα.
In particular, if M is a countable model of ZFC+GCH, and g is a class function in M that maps each
infinite regular cardinal to an infinite cardinal, and
for any infinite regular cardinals κ, λ:
κ ≤ λ =⇒ g(κ) ≤ g(λ),
and
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One might hold that it is necessarily true that
2ℵ0 = κ,
and that therefore it is necessarily true that there is a bijection between κ and R. If it is
ZFC-compossible that
(i) a finite-length interval of time contains
a κ-sequence of non-trivial pairwise non-overlapping subintervals,
and
(ii) any real number can be listed during any non-trivial interval of time,
then one should also accept that it is ZFC-possible to list the reals.
The argument shows that it is ZFC-possible to perform a hypertask. It is compatible with
that conclusion that in the actual world, the structure of time does not allow hypertasks.
for each infinite regular cardinal κ:
cf
(
g(κ)
)
> κ,
then there is a class forcing extension of M in which each regular cardinal κ is such that
2κ = g(κ).
Chapter 2
Spatiotemporal structures
“The history of Zeno’s paradoxes is largely the history of concepts of infinity.”
— Cajori (1920, p. 7)
Infinite sequences of events raise many philosophical and mathematical problems. Among
these are several paradoxes inspired by Zeno of Elea. The study of such event-sequences can
be both motivated by and applied to a family of arguments known as Zeno’s dichotomy. These
are typically presented as arguments for the impossibility of motion. Adding a premise to the
effect that a certain kind of motion is possible, they become arguments for a contradiction.
Without interpretative or historical concerns, this chapter characterizes and evaluates a few
novel variations and generalizations of those arguments.
We begin by showing how the structure of dichotomy arguments relates to the property
of incompleteness, which motivated the study of infinitary proofs in Chapter 1. In analyzing
various dichotomy arguments, we take up two main issues. A key premise of these arguments is
that for various notions of possibility, it is not possible for a superevent to occur. Also key is a
premise to the effect that motion through infinitely divisible time and space necessarily involves
a superevent. First, we consider what support can be given for the premise that it is not possible
for a certain kind of superevent to occur. Second, we investigate which kinds of spatiotemporal
dimensions would allow for the occurrence of such event-sequences, and in particular, how the
order types of those dimensions determine the kind of event-sequence that motion through those
dimensions involves.
§2.6 describes a conception of dimensions on which there is no limit placed on how finely
they can be subdivided. We raise two problems for standard views of spatiotemporal dimensions.
One problem has to do with the arbitrariness of the order type of the sequence of moments in
time. The other problem has to do with whether what we call quasi-regions correspond to
spatiotemporal locations.
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2.1 Incompleteness
The incompleteness property of certain logical systems is closely related to the structure of
several Zenonian arguments about motion through infinitely divisible space and time. This
section explains how several of these arguments can be naturally represented as incomplete
logical systems. As we will see, these systems crucially lack infinitary rules of inference.1 Adding
a certain infinitary rule of inference to these systems results in systems that are negation-
complete.2
Achilles and the tortoise
In this example, assume that Achilles begins a race 100 units of distance ahead of the tortoise,
and that throughout the race, the velocity of Achilles is ten times the tortoise’s velocity. A
Zenonian argument suggests that Achilles never reaches the tortoise, because:
Once Achilles covers 100 units, the tortoise has covered 110;
Once Achilles covers 110 units, the tortoise has covered 111;
Once Achilles covers 111 units, the tortoise has covered 111 110 ;
and so on ad infinitum.
The statement that
once Achilles covers 111 19 units, the tortoise has covered 111
1
9
is true in the intended interpretation. But that statement is also unprovable from within the
Zenonian argument without using a rule of inference that requires infinitely many premisses.
The unprovable statement can be defined in terms of the ω-sequence of statements above.
Beth (1966) notes that this anticipates a diagonal definition made relative to an ω-sequence:
As to Zeno’s method of proof, it is interesting that in some cases he anticipates Can-
tor’s diagonal principle. In deriving the Achilles paradox, for instance, he introduces,
starting from his opponent’s thesis [that space is infinitely divisible], an analytic ex-
pression for the [spatial] points which are successively reached by Achilles; then, by
virtue of this expression, he constructs [a definition of] a new [spatial] point for which
this expression does not hold, and which is nevertheless reached by Achilles. (p. 492)
1 Lo´pez-Escobar (1977, p. 75) suggests that “some of the paradoxes of antiquity were paradoxes
because of (implicit) uses” of rules of inference that require infinitely many premisses.
2 As mentioned in Chapter 1, something similar to this is the case with PA. Allowing infinite-length
proofs and sufficiently many uses of various forms of the ω-rule yields a negation-complete system.
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Lo´pez-Escobar (1977) formalizes the Zenonian argument about Achilles and the tortoise as
an incomplete logical system in the following way.
Formal language of the theory of A & T
(a) Individual constants: prq for each rational number r,
(b) Relational constant : P .
Axiomatization of A & T
(a) Axiom: P (p0q, p100q)
(b) Rule of inference:
P (pxq, pyq) =⇒ P
(
pyq, py + 110 (y − x)q
)
Interpretation: “P (prq, psq)” is interpreted (in the classical) model [as saying] that
Achilles is at a distance r from the starting point of the race when the tortoise is at
a distance s from the starting point of the race. (p. 75)
Lo´pez-Escobar (1977) remarks that:
An easy induction on the length of derivations in A & T shows that for no [rational]
number r is the sentence P (prq, prq) provable in A & T. On the other hand it is
well known (nowadays) that P
(
p111 19q, p111
1
9q
)
is true in the classical model. The
fact that P
(
p111 19q, p111
1
9q
)
is true in some models but not provable in the formal
system is, at least since 1930, not paradoxical and it is doubtful that it was the
incompleteness of the formal system A & T that bothered the Greeks.
The problem had to do much more with the underivability in A & T of the following
[infinitary] rule [of inference]:
From: P (px0q, py0q), P (px1q, py1q), . . . , P (pxnq, pynq), . . .
To conclude: P (pxq, pyq)
Where: x = lim
n→∞xn and y = limn→∞ yn.
For it is precisely such a rule which focuses on both the problem of formally expressing
the argument used in the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise as well as on the
problem of how a finitary statement requires infinitely many assumptions for its
derivation. (pp. 75–76)
To derive the conclusion that Achilles catches the tortoise, we first derive the ω-sequence of
sentences
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P (p0q, p100q)
P (p100q, p110q)
P (p110q, p111q)
...

(∗)
and then apply an infinitary rule of inference to derive from the ω-sequence of sentences in *
that
P
(
p111 19q, p111
1
9q
)
.
2.1.1 Logical environments
Lo´pez-Escobar (1993) formalizes a similar Zenonian argument about “a hypothetical race be-
tween Achilles and Hector” (p. 7). We need a few definitions for the next two examples.
A logical environment
Λ :=
(
L, |=,A,` )
consists of:
(i) a language L,
(ii) a set A of sentences of L, called axioms, “which are accepted,
without any doubts, as having the property of truth” (p. 6),
(iii) a concept |= of “truth” for the sentences of L,
(iv) a concept ` of “derivation” for the sentences of L.
The following definitions are given in terms of a logical environment
Λ =
(
L, |=,A,` ).
A sentence σ∈L is true in Λ (i.e., |=Λ σ) iff
σ ∈ |=.
A sentence σ∈L is provable in Λ (i.e., `Λ σ) iff
A ` σ.
Λ is sound iff every sentence that is provable in Λ is true in Λ, i.e.,
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for every sentence σ∈L,
`Λ σ =⇒ |=Λ σ .
Λ is complete iff
Λ is sound and every sentence that is true in Λ is provable in Λ.3
Λ is incomplete iff
Λ is sound and there is a sentence that is true in Λ but not provable in Λ.4
Achilles and Hector
Lo´pez-Escobar (1993) formalizes the Zenonian argument about the race between Achilles and
Hector in an incomplete logical environment Λ.5 He writes:
What appears paradoxical about Zeno’s argument is that, on the one hand, Achilles
does catch up [to] Hector and on the other hand the [Zenonian] argument suggests
that Hector will always be ahead of Achilles. What the incompleteness of the
logical environment Λ shows is that Zeno’s argument, although sound, is not powerful
enough to capture all [of] the true statements about the race, i.e. true statements in
Λ. In fact the “provable” statements of Zeno’s argument are but a [proper] subset
of the statements specifying the simultaneous positions of Achilles and Hector.
Thus, with 100% hindsight we see that historically Zeno had the “first incomplete-
ness theorem”. There is another similarity between . . . “Zeno’s incompleteness” and
Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem; namely that adding the “Go¨del sentence” [of
Λ] as a further axiom does not eliminate the incompleteness [of Λ]. . . . Thus, given
any finite set S of true sentences of Λ one can determine another true statement σ
[of Λ] such that σ is not derivable from S [in Λ]. (pp. 9–10)
The Zenonian incompleteness result corresponds to the fact that Λ is incomplete. What
Lo´pez-Escobar refers to as “the Go¨del sentence of Λ” in the passage quoted above is a statement
that expresses the fact that Achilles catches up to Hector. Let us turn to a formalization of a
dichotomy argument as an incomplete logical environment.
2.1.2 Incompleteness in a dichotomy argument
A special case of the race between Achilles and the tortoise is one in which the tortoise is always
at rest. Dichotomy arguments can be thought of as concerning this kind of situation.
Lo´pez-Escobar (1993, p. 5) cites a dichotomy argument from Kirk and Raven (1957, p. 293):
3 Standardly, the definition of a “complete” logical system does not require soundness.
4 Standardly, the definition of an “incomplete” logical system does not require soundness.
5 We omit the details of Λ. Instead we will consider the formalization of a dichotomy argument in
the next subsection.
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It is impossible [for you] to traverse the stadium; because before you reach the far end
[of the stadium], you must first reach the half-way point; [and] before you reach the
half-way point you must [first] reach the point half way to it; and so on ad infinitum.
Lo´pez-Escobar (1993) represents this dichotomy argument as a logical environment
Σ :=
(
L2, |=2,A2,`2
)
.
L2 is a first-order language suitable for discussing the non-negative rationals, and contains:
• A set of individual variables: x, . . . .
• The function symbols: +, ×, / for plus, times and division respectively.
• The binary relation symbols: <, ≤.
• The individual constants: 0, 1, 2.
• The unary predicate N for the natural numbers.
• The binary relation of equality between terms: =.
• The usual sentential connectives: ∧, ∨, ¬, and ⊃. (pp. 10–11)
L2 also contains:
• The first-order quantifiers ∀, ∃.
• The binary relation symbol ℘.
For any terms t, x of L2, the interpretation of
℘(t, x)
is that
Achilles has covered x stades in t seconds.6
To properly define Σ, we need to fill in some details that Lo´pez-Escobar (1993, §6) omits.
Define the first-order structure
T2 :=
(
Q,N,+,×, /,<,≤, 0, 1, 2, R′),
where for any non-negative rationals t, x:
〈t, x〉 ∈ R′ iff Achilles has covered x stades in t seconds.
Define |=2 so that for each sentence σ∈L2,
6 A stade, or stadion, is a unit of distance.
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|=2 σ iff T2 satisfies σ.
A sentence σ∈L2 is arithmetical iff σ contains no occurrences of the symbol ‘℘’.
Define the first-order structure
Q :=
(
Q,N,+,×, /,<,≤, 0, 1, 2).
An arithmetical sentence σ∈L2 is an arithmetical truth of Σ iff σ is atomic and true in Q.7
Assume that Achilles can traverse a stade in 20 seconds. Then the Zenonian axiom for Σ is:
℘(20,1).
Let A2 be the set containing every arithmetical truth of Σ and the Zenonian axiom for Σ.
The Zenonian rule of inference for Σ is:
from: ℘(t, x)
infer: ∃t′
(
t′ < t ∧ ℘(t′, x2 )).
Σ-proofs are natural deduction derivations (of finite length), from the set A2 of axioms, that
may use the rules of L (with equality) and the Zenonian rule of inference for Σ.
Define `Σ so that for each sentence σ∈L2,
Γ `Σ σ iff there is a Σ-proof of σ
whose undischarged assumption formulas are in Γ ∪ A2.
Theorem 1′: Σ is sound.
Proof : Use induction on the length of Σ-proofs.
To show that Σ is incomplete, we will follow the presentation in Lo´pez-Escobar (1993, §6).
Since Achilles reaches the end of the stadium, the sentence
∃t ℘(t,1)
is true in Σ.
Since Achilles started to traverse the stadium, the sentence
∃t ℘(t,0)
is true in Σ.
It is easy to show the following:
7 Note that what Lo´pez-Escobar calls the “arithmetical truths of Σ” are quantifier-free.
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`Σ ∃t ℘(t, 11
)
,
`Σ ∃t ℘
(
t, 12
)
,
`Σ ∃t ℘
(
t, 14
)
,
`Σ ∃t ℘
(
t, 18
)
,
...
Theorem 3: For each rational k ≥ 0,
∃t ℘(t,k) is provable in Σ iff ∃n∈N 1
2n
= k.
Proof : For the ⇒ direction, use the completeness theorem for L.
There is no n∈N such that
1
2n
= 0.
By Theorem 3,
0Σ ∃t ℘(t,0).
Thus, Σ is incomplete.
2.2 Some general forms of dichotomy arguments
We can formulate a simple version of Zeno’s dichotomy as an argument for a contradiction, on
the basis of three claims:
P1: Motion is possible.
P2: Necessarily, motion involves a superevent.
P3: No superevent is possible.
Before we refine this argument, a number of remarks will be helpful. Each premise involves
the same variety of modality. But there are different readings of these claims depending on
which kind of modality we understand them as mentioning. There are various kinds of logical
possibility, various kinds of mathematical possibility, and there are conceptual, metaphysical,
nomic, and epistemic kinds of possibility, among others. Much can be said about dichotomy
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arguments even without specifying which kind of modality we take them to involve, because
some remarks apply regardless of which of these modalities we have in mind.
In any case, we can reason to a contradiction trivially. Abbreviating “motion occurs” with
M , and “a superevent occurs” with S, the premisses are structured as follows.
P1: ♦M
P2: 
(
M → S)
P3: ¬♦S
By P1, there is a possible world w in which motion occurs. By P2, every possible world in
which motion occurs is one in which a superevent occurs. So in w, a superevent occurs. But by
P3, there is no possible world in which a superevent occurs. Contradiction.
8
Since P1, P2, and P3 are together inconsistent, we ought to reject at least one of the ar-
gument’s premisses or inferences. One should diagnose the mistake involved and explain why
it was initially tempting. Ideally, one’s treatment of the dichotomy should be consistent with
one’s treatments of other paradoxical arguments about space and time.
A premise like P3 — but mentioning tasks rather than events — appears in a number
of rational reconstructions of specific instances of Zeno’s dichotomy.9 Arguments against the
possibility of performing a supertask were advanced by Black (1951) and Thomson (1954), but
were shown to be invalid by Benacerraf (1962).10 Benacerraf noticed that some supertasks are
such that it is underdetermined by L what would result from their respective completion.
P2 states that every possible world in which motion occurs is one in which a superevent
occurs. In particular, P2 implies that in the actual world, motion involves the occurrence of a
superevent. If there is a possible world in which motion occurs without involving a superevent,
then P2 is false. For example, perhaps a possible world in which neither time nor space are
infinitely divisible is one in which motion need not involve a superevent.
We can give other dichotomy arguments that avoid these shortcomings.
Strengthening the simple dichotomy argument
There are several easy ways to strengthen the simple version of the dichotomy.
One way is to weaken P2, and then adjust P1 similarly. This gives:
8 The modal principles needed to derive a contradiction from these premisses are relatively weak.
9 The arguments are treated systematically by Gru¨nbaum (1968, 1973). More recent work is surveyed
by Earman & Norton (1996) and Koetsier & Allis (1997).
10 This exchange is covered by Chihara (1965), Gru¨nbaum (1969), and Salmon (2001). We survey
several related arguments in §2.4.
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P4: Motion through infinitely divisible space and time is possible.
P5: Necessarily, motion through infinitely divisible space and time involves a superevent.
P6: No superevent is possible.
The phrase “infinitely divisible space and time” is intended to indicate the infinitely divisibility
of both space and time. If motion through space and time that is not infinitely divisible is
possible and does not involve a superevent, then P5 is weaker than P2.
Alternatively, we could weaken P3 and leave P1 and P2 unchanged. This gives:
P7: Motion is possible.
P8: Necessarily, motion involves a superevent.
P9: No superevent of the kind that motion necessarily involves is possible.
If there are superevents that are not of the kind that motion necessarily involves, then P9 is
weaker than P3.
Incorporating all of these changes gives:
P10: Motion through infinitely divisible space and time is possible.
P11: Necessarily, motion through infinitely divisible space and time involves a superevent.
P12: No superevent of the kind that
motion through infinitely divisible space and time necessarily involves
is possible.
If there is a kind of superevent that
(i) is necessarily involved in motion through infinitely divisible space and time,
and
(ii) is not necessarily involved in every kind of motion,
then P12 is weaker than P9. For example, if motion through infinitely divisible space and time
necessarily involves an ω-sequence of motions, then there is a kind of superevent that satisfies
condition i. If it is also the case that motion through discrete (i.e., only finitely divisible) space
and time need not involve a superevent, then there is a kind of superevent that satisfies condition
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ii — namely, a superevent consisting of an ω-sequence of movements. In that case, P12 is weaker
than P9.
There is another way to weaken the premisses of this version of the dichotomy argument. The
notions of modality that are used in the premisses do not need to be the same — it suffices that
they be appropriately related to one another. In the analog of P12, we will move the negation
inside the scope of the modal operator, which then switches from a ♦ to a . This gives:
There are notions of possibility ♦1, ♦2, ♦3,
and an infinite linear order type τ
for which these five statements hold:
P13: ♦1
(
Motion in infinitely divisible space and time occurs.
)
P14: If there are any ♦1-worlds in which
motion in infinitely divisible space and time occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦2-world.11
P15: 2
(
Motion in infinitely divisible space and time involves a τ -event.
)
P16: If there are any ♦2-worlds in which a τ -event occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦3-world.
P17: 3
(
No τ -event occurs.
)
To reach a contradiction, reason as follows. P13 and P14 jointly imply that
♦2
(
Motion in infinitely divisible space and time occurs.
)
.
P15 and the previous line jointly imply that
♦2
(
A τ -event occurs.
)
.
P16 and the previous line jointly imply that
♦3
(
A τ -event occurs.
)
.
The previous line contradicts P17.
In order to further refine these premisses, we will be more specific about infinite divisibility.
11 A ♦i-world is a world that is possible with respect to the notion of possibility ♦i.
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2.2.1 Infinite divisibility
For simplicity, we will consider only those possible worlds with one spatial dimension and one
temporal dimension. As abbreviations, call the temporal dimension T and the spatial dimension
S1.12
S1 (and likewise T ) might be taken to consist of points, intervals, regions, parts, locations,
places, positions, stretches, chunks, pieces, lengths, distances, etc. To be neutral among such
views, we will use the term constituent. S1 (and likewise T ) might be taken to have two or more
kinds of constituents, with some of those kinds being more ontologically fundamental.
What will we mean by saying that S1 (or likewise T ) is “infinitely divisible”? We can state
the infinite divisibility of S1 in a way that applies regardless of the kind of constituents that
S1 is taken to have. For example, these definitions do not depend on whether constituents are
points or regions. This can be done in terms of a 2-place reflexive relation overlaps, which is
defined in terms of constituents of S1.
Let ≺ indicate the irreflexive transitive relation “is to the left of”, and likewise let  indicate
“is to the right of”.
For any constituents α, β, we say that α is adjacent to β iff there is no constituent that is
between α and β.13
When S1 contains at least two constituents that are pairwise non-overlapping and pairwise
non-adjacent, the infinite divisibility of S1 can be understood as a kind of density requirement:
For any non-overlapping non-adjacent constituents α, β of S1,
there is a constituent γ of S1 such that:
(i) γ does not overlap α or overlap β,
(ii) γ is not adjacent to α or adjacent to β,
(iii) γ lies (entirely) between α and β.14
This kind of statement of divisibility can be given a sort of Aristotelian reading on which
the divisibility of S1 is potentially infinite but not actually infinite.15 For example, on one such
reading, for any non-overlapping non-adjacent constituents α, β, it is possible that there is a
constituent which meets conditions i, ii, and iii.
Now we define a notion of infinite divisibility that we will call “ω-divisibility”, that cannot
12 These are not names for spatiotemporal dimensions of the actual world.
13 The relation “is adjacent to” on the collection of constituents of S1 is reflexive. Likewise for T .
14 Either α ≺ γ ≺ β, or α  γ  β.
15 See Hellman & Shapiro (2017, Chapter 3).
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be given a straightforward reading in the Aristotelian spirit. Our notion also generalizes in an
obvious way to stronger kinds of divisibility.
Define S1 is ω-divisible as:
There are at least two non-overlapping non-adjacent constituents of S1, and
for any non-overlapping non-adjacent constituents α, β of S1,
there is a sequence 〈xi〉i∈ω of pairwise non-overlapping, pairwise non-adjacent
constituents of S1 ordered as:
α, x0, x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . . , β.
For example, suppose that S1 consists only of points. It is natural to assume that for any
points x, y in S1, if x 6= y, then x and y do not overlap.16 Let 0 and 1 be distinct points in S1
such that 0 ≺ 1. In this case, if S1 is ω-divisible then there is a sequence
〈xi〉i∈ω
of points in S1 such that
0 ≺ x0 ≺ x1 ≺ x2 ≺ . . . ≺ xn ≺ . . . 1.
In this example, in order for an object to move from the point 0 to the point 1, it must pass
through an ω-sequence of points: one point, then another point, then another, and so on.
Switching our choices of α and β, and letting  indicate the “is to the right of” relation
(which is the inverse of ≺), there is a sequence
〈yi〉i∈ω
of points in S1 such that
1  y0  y1  y2  . . .  yn  . . . 0,
which is equivalent to
0 . . . ≺ yn ≺ . . . ≺ y2 ≺ y1 ≺ y0 ≺ 1.
Thus, in order to move from 0 to 1, the object also must pass through the points of the sequence
〈yi〉i∈ω
in reverse order, with no first member.17
16 This property does not hold for some other kinds of constituents, like e.g. intervals.
17 In that order, the points form an ω∗-sequence. See §2.5.2 and §2.5.3.
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2.2.2 An ω-divisibility argument
Abusing notation, let T ×S1 be the plane formed by T and S1.
We will say that T ×S1 is ω-divisible iff both T and S1 are ω-divisible.
There is another way to weaken several premisses of the dichotomy argument. If some but not
all types of superevents are impossible, and some but not all kinds of motion would involve such
(impossible) types of superevents, then some but not all kinds of motion are impossible. With
this in mind, we can formulate a more general dichotomy argument in terms of ω-divisibility.
There are notions of possibility ♦1, ♦2, ♦3,
a type µ (of motion), and an infinite linear order type τ
for which these five statements hold:18
P18: ♦1
(
Type µ motion in an ω-divisible T ×S1 occurs.
)
P19: If there are any ♦1-worlds in which
type µ motion in an ω-divisible T ×S1 occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦2-world.
P20: 2
(
Type µ motion in an ω-divisible T ×S1 involves a τ -event.
)
P21: If there are any ♦2-worlds in which a τ -event occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦3-world.
P22: 3
(
No τ -event occurs.
)
Questions related to premisses like P22 — but mentioning tasks rather than events — are
addressed by the authors mentioned at the beginning of §2.2. For example: Which notions of
possibility allow for the performance of a supertask?
Questions surrounding premisses like P20 have been neglected, perhaps because dichotomy
arguments were not sufficiently precisified, strengthened, and generalized. For example, one
such question is:
Conceiving of T and S1 as non-empty dense linear orders without endpoints, and identifying
motions with position functions:
What is the relationship between the order types of T and S1
and the order type of the event-sequence that motion through T ×S1 involves?
18 This version of the dichotomy argument is generalized in §2.5.1.
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When T and S1 are not order-isomorphic, the answer is not obvious. To begin to address
this question, we need to be more precise about the order-structure of T ×S1.
2.3 Continua for time and space
This section discusses a class of ordered structures that we will use to represent the dimensions of
time and space. We will also explain several ways in which it is possible — at least conceptually
— for the order types of these dimensions to differ from one another.
Particular dichotomy arguments can vary along three parameters:
• the variety of modality that is mentioned,
• the kind of motion that is mentioned,
• the order type of the event-sequence that is mentioned.
With respect to each variety of modality, one can ask a number of questions:
Q11: Which mathematical structures is it possible for an ω-divisible T ×S1 to have?
Q12: In each possible ω-divisible T ×S1, which kinds of motion are possible?
Q13: Which order types do possible event-sequences have?
Q14: For which values of µ and τ is P20 true?
A special case of Q14 is:
Q15: Which order types do event-sequences that are necessarily involved in
every possible motion through every possible ω-divisible T ×S1 have?
I.e., with respect to each variety of modality: which linear order types τ are such that necessarily,
every possible motion through any possible ω-divisible T ×S1 involves a τ -event?
A related question is:
Q16: How does the structure of the spatiotemporal dimensions in a possible world
determine (or constrain) the kinds of motion which may occur in that world?
A spatiotemporal structure is mathematically compatible with the occurrence of some but
not all kinds of motion. For example, suppose that T is (structured like) an ordered field. Then
an α-event may occur in T ×S1 only if a bounded interval of T contains an α-sequence of non-
trivial pairwise non-overlapping subintervals.19 Since no bounded subinterval of R is the union
19 When T is an ordered field, this requirement is equivalent to the condition that there be an
order-embedding of α into T .
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of uncountably many non-trivial pairwise non-overlapping subintervals, it is not possible for a
hyperevent to occur in a world in which time is structured like R (under its usual ordering).
This rules out certain kinds of motion: e.g., if T is structured like R, it is not mathematically
possible — even allowing arbitrarily large but finite velocities and accelerations — for an object
to make uncountably many pairwise disjoint stops, with each stop lasting for some non-trivial
interval of time.
With respect to the metaphysical question
What is the nature of motion?,
Russell (2013, p. 65) in his 1901 paper Mathematics and the Metaphysicians writes that:
. . . a body in motion is just as truly where it is as a body at rest. Motion consists
merely in the fact that bodies are sometimes in one place and sometimes in another,
and that they are at intermediate places at intermediate times.
In 1903, Russell (2015, p. 480) writes that motion “consists merely in the occupation of
different places at different times, subject to continuity”. A natural way of spelling out part of
the continuity requirement on motion, in the simple case of a point particle moving through two
dimensions, is the following.
Let t, t′ be moments with t < t′. Let x, y be distinct spatial points.
If a point particle p moves from x at t to y at t′, then two conditions hold:
(i) At each time in
(
t, t′
)
, p occupies exactly one spatial point between (and including)
x and y.
(ii) Each spatial point strictly between x and y is occupied by p at some or other time
in
[
t, t′
]
.
Treating T ×S1 as a mathematical structure, it is common to treat every kind of motion
through T ×S1 as a position function, i.e., a mapping from the constituents of an interval of T
into the constituents of an interval of S1.20 On this picture, the claim that
it is mathematically possible for motion of kind µ to occur in T ×S1
is expressed by a formal mathematical statement.
20 On Russell’s conception of motion, a position function must be a bijective mapping between an
interval of T and an interval of S1. We return to this issue in §2.3.2.
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There are various kinds of mathematical possibility, depending on what is counted as “math-
ematics”.21 From certain sufficiently strong background theories, some mathematical statements
are provably independent of sufficiently strong consistent theories (e.g., ZFC, if it is consistent).
Thus, relative to our (choice of) logical and mathematical assumptions at the levels of object-
theory, meta-theory, etc., it may be provably independent of our axioms whether a particular
spatiotemporal structure is mathematically compatible with the occurrence of a certain kind of
motion. If a formal statement which expresses that mathematical compatibility is independent
of our axioms, it may even be that our meta-theory is unable to prove the independence of that
statement from our axioms. The independence phenomena in set theory seem to carry over to
the truths about which propositions are mathematically possible with respect to any sufficiently
strong consistent formal system.
2.3.1 Line-structures
To discuss some of the ways that it is conceptually possible for time and space to be structured,
we will use a few definitions.
A line-structure is a non-empty collection of points under a dense linear ordering without
endpoints.
An interval of a line-structure is non-trivial iff it contains more than one point.
We will say that non-trivial bounded intervals come in four types; where a < b, these are:
open: (a, b)
closed : [a, b]
open-closed : (a, b]
closed-open: [a, b)
A line-structure is locally uniform iff
all of its non-trivial bounded open intervals are order-isomorphic.22
A line-structure is locally symmetric iff
each of its non-trivial bounded open intervals (a, b)
is order-isomorphic to the inverse order of (a, b).23
21 For example, one can ask what is mathematically possible with respect to a particular consistent
theory or (semi-)formal system, similar to what we did in §1.5.1.
22 The global analog of local uniformity is stronger. A line-structure is globally uniform iff it is
order-isomorphic to all of its non-trivial bounded open subintervals.
23 A line-structure is globally symmetric iff it is order-isomorphic to its inverse order.
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For any collection C, we write [a, b)C for{
x∈C : a ≤ x < b},
and similarly for (a, b]C , (a, b)C , and [a, b]C .
For any collection C, we write C<x for
{y∈C : y < x},
and similarly for C≤x, C>x, and C≥x.
We will treat T and S1 each as locally uniform, locally symmetric line-structures. We are
treating the dimensions of time and space respectively as consisting of points, and being ω-
divisible, containing at least ℵ0 points in each non-trivial interval. Local uniformity ensures
that every non-trivial bounded interval of time (respectively: space) is structurally homogenous
with respect to its order type. Local symmetry ensures that every non-trivial bounded interval
of time (respectively: space) is structurally homogenous with respect to direction.
2.3.2 Mismatches between time and space
It is conceptually possible for time to have a different mathematical structure than that of
the spatial dimension(s). In the context of dichotomy arguments, this possibility matters for
assessing premisses like P20, which state that a certain kind of motion through a certain kind of
T ×S1 necessarily involves an event-sequence of a certain order type.
We will consider two ways that T and S1 might be incompatible with respect to their order
types. Then we will explain how they can be combined.
If we identify motions with position functions, conceptual difficulties arise even with simple
uniform motion when a non-trivial bounded closed (respectively: open) interval of T and a
non-trivial bounded closed (respectively: open) interval of S1 are not order-isomorphic to one
another.
For example, consider an object moving uniformly from left to right through the interval
[0, 1]S1 from an initial moment ti until a final moment tf > ti, with position function
s :
[
ti, tf
] −→ [0, 1].
If the spatial interval [0, 1]S1 is order-embeddable into
[
ti, tf
]
, but not vice versa, then there is
some moment
t ∈ (ti, tf)
at which s is undefined — i.e., t is not in the domain of s. The object is not assigned a location
at time t by s. If we insist that the object has a location at t, we might say that because the
motion is smooth, the object’s location at t must be to the right of every point in
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s
[
[ti, t)
]
and to the left of every point in
s
[(
t, tf
]]
.
But no points in S1 answer to that description. Perhaps the object nevertheless has a location
at that time, in which case there are locations of S1 that do not correspond to any point in S1.
As we will see in §2.6, we can make sense of this way of speaking.24
Type I mismatch
For a simple example of this first kind of situation, treat T like (R, <) and S1 like (Q, <). Taking
ti = 0 and tf = 1, define a partial position function
s : [0, 1]R −→ [0, 1]Q.
Suppose that the motion is uniform (at a velocity of 1 time unit per space unit), and that s is
defined only for rational numbers in [0, 1]R.
For each t ∈ dom(s), define the partial function
s(t) :=
t if t∈ [0, 1]Q↑ otherwise.25
Since
s
(√
2
2
)
↑,
where is the object at
t =
√
2
2
?
If the object has a location at that time, then that location does not correspond to any point
in S1. We will suggest that that location lies strictly between every rational
x <
√
2
2
24 In this two-dimensional space, we suggest identifying this spatial location with〈〈
S1<t ,S1>t
〉〉
.
25 Recall that the up-arrow indicates when a partial function is not defined for a particular element of
its domain. The down-arrow indicates when a function is defined for a particular element of its domain.
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and every rational
x >
√
2
2
.
Type II mismatch
Now we consider a simple example of the second kind of situation. If
[
ti, tf
]
is order-embeddable
into the spatial interval [0, 1]S1 but not vice versa, then there is some spatial point
x ∈ (0, 1)S1
such that at no time between ti and tf does the object occupy x, despite occupying points to
the left of (and arbitrarily close to) x and points to the right of (and arbitrarily close to) x.26
In this case the object seems to skip from places to the left of x to places to the right of x, even
though there is a sense in which its motion is smooth — it passes through every spatial point
between s(ti) and s
(
tf
)
. Despite there being no point in
[
ti, tf
]
at which the object occupies x,
perhaps there is some time of T at which it occupies x. Or so we will suggest.
For a simple example of this second kind of situation, treat T like (Q, <), and S1 like (R, <).
Taking ti = 0 and tf = 1, define a position function
s : [0, 1]Q −→ [0, 1]R.
Suppose that the motion is uniform (at a velocity of 1 spatial unit per temporal unit), and that
∀t ∈ dom(s) s(t) := t.
Since only rational numbers are in the image of s, when does the object occupy the spatial point
x =
√
2
2
?
Combining mismatches
It is conceptually possible for these two kinds of “mismatch” to occur together.
We will say that line-structures l1 and l2 are locally incomparable iff
for any non-trivial bounded open interval of l1,
and any non-trivial bounded open interval of l2,
neither of those intervals order-embeds into the other.27
26 For any spatial point y < x, there is a spatial point z > y which the object eventually occupies.
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In other words, if a < b and c < d, then no interval of the form (a, b) in either dimension
order-embeds into any interval of the form (c, d) of the other dimension.28
When (C,<) is a linearly ordered class, we say that a line-structure locally embeds C iff
(C,<) order-embeds into each of that line-structure’s non-trivial bounded open intervals.
Real analysis could provide an empirically adequate method of approximation for mechanics
in some possible worlds in which spatiotemporal dimensions are not isomorphic to R but locally
embed R and are locally Euclidean. For this reason, line-structures that locally embed R are
especially interesting models of spatiotemporal dimensions.29
We will say that a line-structure is nice iff
it is locally uniform, locally symmetric, and locally embeds R.30
In order for there not to be any “local mismatch” between T and S1, it must be that for any
non-trivial bounded open interval of T , and any non-trivial bounded open interval of S1, each
of those intervals order-embeds into the other.31
The possibility of a local mismatch between T and S1 can be used to argue against premisses
like P11, which states that
Necessarily, motion through infinitely divisible space and time involves a superevent.
For example, as we will see in §2.5.5, the fact that
T ×S1 is ω-divisible
does not in general imply that
motion through T ×S1 involves an ω-event.
We will return to problems about motion through mismatched dimensions after considering
what support can be given for various instances of P22.
27 Two line-structures are globally incomparable iff neither of them order-embeds into the other.
28 This property will be important for the divisibility argument in §2.5.
29 Both kinds of mismatch can occur even when T and S1 each locally embed R.
30
Q17: Is it consistent relative to ZFC that there are, up to order-isomorphism,
infinitely many nice line-structures that are pairwise locally incomparable?
Uncountably many? Proper-class-many?
31 This condition does not preclude a “global mismatch” between T and S1.
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2.4 The possibility of ω-tasks
This section surveys five arguments for the conclusion that it is not possible to perform certain
kinds of ω-tasks. Those five arguments respectively use the following five considerations:
• No task in an ω-task brings us “closer” to completing the sequence.
• If an ω-task were completed, it would be completed “suddenly”.
• No task in an ω-task is such that finishing that task completes the sequence.
• No point in a monotonic ω-sequence is such that reaching it gets you to an endpoint.
• If a supertask were completed, infinitely many failures would amount to a success.
These points will be explained in this section.
Borrowing a phrase from Thomson (1967, p. 187), the dichotomy arguments suggest that
“there should be a difficulty about understanding how” an object can pass through a bounded
monotone ω-sequence of points in S1. As we will see, the difficulty is conceptual and has to do
with the order type ω. Thomson (1967) writes:
What causes trouble is doubtless that (in the kind of sequence [that] we are talking
of) there is no last term, so that one does not see what finishing consists in in such a
case. But, in the context of the Race Course anyway, this trouble is illusory; finishing
consists in occupying the limit point of the class [of spatial points in the sequence],
and we may suppose that this is the last point occupied. (p. 188)
The Zenonian worry that Thomson refers to is about how it is possible to traverse a (non-
empty) sequence of points in which there is no last point. Thomson dismisses the worry on the
basis that the last point to be occupied is the limit point of the point-sequence, the limit point
being the (ω + 1)-th point. But an (ω + 1)-task is completed only if an ω-task is completed. In
order for the object to occupy the limit point of the sequence — or to occupy any point that
follows every point in the sequence — an ω-task must first be completed. We should not dismiss
the worry on these grounds as Thomson does.
The Zenonian claims that it is not clear enough what completing an ω-sequence of traversals
consists in. We can reply that completing an ω-task consists in finishing every task in the
sequence, and that an ω-task is completed once there comes a time by which every task in the
sequence has been finished. The Zenonian can and should concede this, but has good reason to
remain unsatisfied. There is still a conceptual difficulty with understanding how every task in
an ω-sequence of them can be — or would be — completed.
Let us explain part of what is puzzling about the completion of an ω-task. Every task in an
ω-task is preceded by only finitely many tasks in the sequence, but followed by infinitely many
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others in the sequence. Whichever task in the ω-task has just been finished, an ω-sequence of
other tasks remains to be completed.
In one sense of the word “closer”, for each positive integer n, finishing the first n tasks brings
one no closer to completing the sequence of tasks. This is because immediately after finishing
any particular task in the sequence, there are infinitely many tasks left to finish, just as there
were before that particular task was begun. Since each task in the sequence is preceded by
only finitely many tasks, no task in the sequence brings us closer (in that sense of “closer”)
to completing the sequence. At any time during the doing of an ω-task, infinitely many tasks
remain to be finished before the whole ω-task can be completed.
Think of the closed-open interval to be crossed as consisting of an ω-sequence
〈in〉n∈N
of pairwise disjoint closed-open subintervals, with for each n∈N,
in :=
[
xn, xn+1
)
,
with in immediately to the left of in+1. Once the first subinterval i0 has been crossed, every
subinterval in the subsequence
〈in+1〉n∈N
must be crossed in order for the entire interval to be crossed. At every time throughout the
crossing of the subintervals one at a time, infinitely many subintervals remain to be crossed in
order for the entire interval to have been crossed.32
Because of this feature, we might say that an ω-task, if completed, is completed suddenly.
At no point during the doing of an ω-task have infinitely many of its tasks been finished, but
suddenly, once the ω-task has been completed, infinitely many tasks have been finished. Part
of the conceptual difficulty is understanding how this could happen. The coherence of formal
models or mathematical descriptions of supertasks does not by itself alleviate the difficulty.
What is needed is some kind of an explanation.
Groarke (1982, pp. 69–70) describes an argument for the conclusion that traversing a mono-
tonic ω-sequence of spatial points is impossible:33
. . . the crossing of the [infinite series of] distances one by one is alleged to be im-
possible because the series contains no last element. In attempting to traverse the
32 Given certain assumptions which we will discuss in §2.5.5, crossing i0 already involves a superevent.
One way in which reverse forms of the dichotomy argument — which mention an ω∗-sequence of points
or subintervals — are simpler than standard forms of the dichotomy is that they lack this feature.
33 Unfortunately, Groarke uses “series” instead of “sequence”.
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distances, one therefore crosses a particular distance and continually proceeds to an-
other distance which [too] must be traversed. One never reaches a last distance [in
the series], its completion, and the consequent completion of the series. It allegedly
follows that one cannot complete [the traversal of] the [infinite] series [of distances].
Since the sequence of subintervals does not contain a final member (and is non-empty),
each subinterval in the sequence is followed by a unique successor in the sequence. There is no
subinterval in the ω-sequence such that crossing it completes the traversal of the entire interval.
Groarke explains that:
. . . the problem with our attempt to complete [the traversal of] Zeno’s sequence of
distances is precisely that we cross the distances in the sequence a finite number at
a time — i.e. one by one. The question at issue is how we can, proceeding in this
way, ever come to a point where we have crossed an infinite number of distances,
and the claim in question is the claim that we cannot do so because we never reach
a distance which counts as the last element in an infinite sequence. The claim that
we can cross an infinite sequence of distances despite its lack of a last element, and
the bald assertion that we can thereby reach the limit point of Zeno’s sequence, both
beg the very question at issue. One needs an argument to establish that these claims
are true . . . (p. 70)34
To describe an asymmetry in the order type ω, a few definitions will be helpful.
A proper initial segment of an ω-sequence 〈in〉n∈N is a subsequence
〈i0, . . . , ij〉,
for some j∈N.
A final segment of an ω-sequence 〈in〉n∈N is a subsequence〈
ik, ik+1, ik+2, . . .
〉
,
for some k∈N.
Every proper initial segment of an ω-sequence has a final member, but every final segment
of an ω-sequence lacks a final member. This asymmetry is a feature of the order type ω. It
is difficult to understand how the sequential completion of proper initial segments of an ω-
sequence of tasks — with each proper initial segment having a final task — could amount to
the completion of the entire ω-sequence of tasks, which has no final task. Groarke writes that:
. . . no act within the sequence brings it to completion. It is as though one tried to
accomplish a task by repeatedly performing actions which failed to complete the task
in question. (p. 73)
34 This point is analogous to one made by Chihara (1965, p. 81) about ω∗-tasks. See our §2.5.2.
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Each task in the ω-sequence is a failure in that finishing that task fails to complete the
ω-task. It seems that if the traversal of an ω-sequence of points were to occur, then infinitely
many individual failures would have amounted to a success. And for the reasons mentioned
earlier, it is not clear even how an ω-sequence of failures could be completed.
The completion of an ω-task is conceptually puzzling. But this does not constitute good
grounds for denying that the completion of an ω-task is possible — whether conceptually, or
under various other notions of possibility. Treating T and S1 as order-isomorphic line-structures
and identifying motions with position functions has a number of puzzling consequences, one of
which is that superevents occur if motion occurs. In these ways of modeling space, time, and
motion, continuous motion always involves (at least) a superevent.
2.5 Variations of dichotomy arguments
This section surveys a number of arguments that are related to dichotomy arguments.
Granting that it is possible in a finite length of time to traverse an ω-sequence of distinct
spatial points, there are other conceptual difficulties with the occurrence of infinite sequences
of events. For example, at no stage of an ω-sequence of movements does one move from a place
to the intended endpoint. How can one arrive at a point p merely by moving to points that fall
short of p?
Thomson (1967) calls the spatial points in the ω-sequence
1
2
,
3
4
,
7
8
,
15
16
, . . .
Z-points:
The [dichotomy] paradox says that to get [from 0] to 1 the man must pass over all [of]
the Z-points. This is indeed necessary, but it is also sufficient. There is no question
of his having to pass over all [of] the Z-points and then do something else. It is not
even true that he must pass over all [of] the Z-points and then finish. For it is plainly
impossible for him to have passed over all [of] the Z-points without having passed
over 1. To pass over all [of] the Z-points and to get to 1 are the same thing. (p. 188)
Thomson is implicitly assuming that in S1, the sequence of Z-points converges, and that it
converges to 1. In a structure like, e.g.,
(R, 0, 1, <,+, ·),
the sequence of Z-points converges to an element of the field. But there are other number
systems in which the sequence of Z-points does not converge to any point.35 Thus, whether
35 For example, there are number systems — containing infinitesimals — in which no bounded mono-
tone ω-sequence of points converges to a point.
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passing through all of the Z-points suffices for reaching the intended endpoint of the motion
depends on the mathematical structure of S1. In particular, this depends on whether bounded
monotone ω-sequences of points converge to a point in S1.
Convergence in physical space
Groarke (1982, p. 71) argues that there is a difficulty in understanding how traversing the
sequence of Z-points could be sufficient for reaching its limit point:
. . . given that the crossing of a sequence of intervals does not take one to a point
outside [of] the sequence, the crossing of the sequence [that] Zeno proscribes can
never take one to the endpoint of a motion (for this point lies outside [of] all [of]
the intervals [that are] within the sequence). Any attempt to complete the motion
by crossing the intervals one by one therefore seems bound to failure (though it is
also necessary for the completion of the motion). It is as though one tried to move
something to a point b by repeatedly moving it to points that all fall short of b.
If the sequence of Z-points converges in S1, and if one completes the traversal of the sequence
of Z-points, then one is able to reach a point merely by traversing subintervals none of which
contain the limit point of the sequence. But it seems as though success (in reaching the intended
endpoint) could not be achieved by infinitely many failures (to reach the intended endpoint).
Groarke (1982, p. 72) puts this challenge in the form of a question:
Why is it that the crossing of a sequence of spatial intervals can, by itself, take one
to a point outside all [of] the intervals in the sequence? In completing the sequence
one crosses the individual intervals and does nothing else besides. How then can one
reach a point that one doesn’t reach in crossing [any] one of the intervals in question?
How can one succeed in getting to a place merely by going to places other than that place?
It is natural to think that in order to reach a final destination in physical space, eventually one
must move from some place other than the final destination to the final destination. But this
never happens if S1 is ω-divisible. If the sequence of Z-points converges in S1, then it suffices
for reaching 1 (from 0) that one moves to spatial points other than 1. No point is adjacent to
any other point, so in particular, the limit point is not adjacent to any of the Z-points. In this
sense, each point in S1 is “isolated” from every other point in S1.
This conceptual problem about convergence is not adequately answered by the stipulation
that in S1, the sequence of Z-points converges to a point. Assuming that S1 is (at least locally)
structured like a Dedekind complete ordered field, it is a consequence of the least-upper-bound
property that traversing the sequence of Z-points brings one to occupy the limit point.36 But the
36 For a discussion of Dedekind completeness, see Propp (2013).
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conceptual difficulty has to do with how a dimension of physical space could ever be structured
in such a way that a bounded monotone ω-sequence of spatial points would converge to a point
outside of the sequence. The concern is not about consistency, or about the mathematical
coherence of structures in which such sequences converge. Rather, the concern is about how we
can understand such structures as models of space and time in which motion occurs.37
We can restate the question as follows. Let x and y be distinct non-adjacent places in an
ω-divisible S1. Leave it open whether S1 and T consist of points. In order for an object to move
in a continuous — in the informal sense of that word — path p from x to y, where p contains
x and y only at its start and end (respectively), the object must move to places which are not
y, until it finally reaches y. How can the object reach y merely by moving to places other than
y? Let p′ be the result of removing y from p. How can traversing p′ suffice for reaching y? How
can an object that traverses p′ thereby traverse p?
Either
(i) there is a “last” place in p such that it comes right before (and is adjacent to) y,
or
(ii) there is no such place.
If i holds, then S1 is not dense with respect to places, which is a necessary condition for it being
ω-divisible with respect to places. When space is treated as being dense with respect to places
(i.e., between any two distinct places in space, there is another one), there is no place (except
perhaps y) that is adjacent to y, and ii holds. But if ii holds, then we must explain how, in a
physical space, moving only to places other than y could suffice for reaching y.
2.5.1 Ultraevents
Here is another kind of worry that is similar to Zeno’s dichotomy argument as it is sometimes
reconstructed. In order to traverse a path p, an object must first traverse a proper initial sub-
path p0 of p, and then traverse a proper initial sub-path p1 of the remaining portion of p, and
so on for sub-paths indexed by each natural number. For any proper initial part (or segment)
of p that has been traversed so far, there remains a further part (or segment) of p that must be
traversed before the whole of p is traversed.
This can also be formulated in terms of portions of a path. For example, in order to traverse
a non-empty path, the first half of that path must be traversed, and then the first half of the
remaining portion must be traversed, and so on.
This idea is easily extended to ordered structures that are more finely subdivided than (Q, <).
For example, the real-closed ordered (proper class) Field of surreal numbers is called No.38 A
37 This problem does not arise for discrete (i.e., non-dense) dimensions.
38 See Alling (1987, Chapter 4) and Gonshor (1986, Chapter 2).
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subclass of No is the proper class On of all ordinals. If S1 were (even locally) structured like
the surreal number line, then in order for an object to move from the spatial point 0 to the
spatial point 1 within a finite length of time, it would have to pass through every point in the
On-length sequence 〈
α
α+ 1
〉
α∈On
.
If we count passing through each of these spatial points as a distinct event, then proper-class-
many events would need be completed in order to move through the unit interval. If this occurs
in a bounded interval of time, then this counts as an ultraevent.39
2.5.2 Non-wellfounded sequences
Recall that a linear order (C,<) is wellfounded iff every non-empty subcollection of C has a
minimal element under <.
One type of non-empty linear order that is non-wellfounded is one that lacks a least element
under its ordering, i.e., it has no initial member in the order. It is not clear how sequences of
events with that kind of order type ever begin. Chihara (1965) expresses puzzlement about this:
In some respects, Zeno’s dichotomy paradox is even more puzzling [than the paradox
of Achilles and the tortoise]. If Achilles is to traverse the [spatial] interval (0, 1), he
must first traverse the interval
(
0, 12
)
. But before he could finish traversing that
interval, he would have to traverse
(
0, 14
)
, and so on ad infinitum. It thus appears
that Achilles must do something analogous to counting all [of] the natural numbers
in reverse order, counting 2 before 1, 3 before 2, 4 before 3, and so forth. But there
is an obvious difficulty in the supposition that someone (even someone superhuman)
might have completed such a task. In this case, the problem is not “How did he
finish?” but rather “How did he start?” And the answer we are looking for is not:
“Very fast indeed!”
The type of problem uncovered by Zeno is not restricted to motion in space: one can
easily generate similar difficulties in a variety of forms. For example, one might very
well argue that it is impossible for Achilles to stand on his head for a full minute
. . . or gain a pound of weight in a continuous fashion. Naturally, what is desired is
some general method of dealing with such difficulties. (p. 81)
For example, under assumptions which we will discuss in §2.5.5, in possible worlds in which
S1 is structured like R, in order for Achilles to traverse a non-trivial spatial interval, something
that is analogous to counting the elements of N in reverse order must occur. This would be
a non-wellfounded superevent. Under similar assumptions, in possible worlds in which S1 is
39 For more discussion, see Al-Dhalimy & Geyer (2016).
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structured like No, something that is analogous to counting the ordinals in reverse order would
occur. This would be a non-wellfounded ultraevent.
2.5.3 The lapse of time
One of the simplest dichotomy arguments does not involve motion at all, and only concerns the
passage of infinitely divisible time.40 We describe a version of this argument below.
For each order type τ , let τ∗ be the reverse order type of τ . For example, ω∗ is the order
type of (N, >).
Assume that T is ω-divisible. Let I be a non-trivial interval of time. Then there is an
ω∗-sequence
〈In〉n∈N
of pairwise non-overlapping subintervals of I, where ∀j, k∈N:
Ij temporally precedes Ik ⇐⇒ j > k.
Letting ≺ indicate “temporally precedes”, we have:
I¤
. . . ≺ In ≺ . . . ≺ I2 ≺ I1 ≺ I0
In order for the interval I to elapse, I0 must elapse. But before I0 begins to elapse, I1 must
elapse. And before I1 begins to elapse, I2 must elapse. And so on. Each one of these subintervals
of I is temporally preceded by (an ω∗-sequence of) other subintervals of I. No subinterval in
this sequence temporally precedes every other subinterval in the sequence — there is no earliest
subinterval in the sequence. The argument concludes that it is impossible for any nontrivial
interval of ω-divisible time to elapse, because no such interval can even begin to elapse. In order
for such an interval to begin to elapse, it must already have begun to elapse.
Here we used ω∗, but the argument generalizes to arbitrary infinite linear order types.41
40 In 1929, Whitehead (1979) writes:
. . . the introduction of motion brings in irrelevant details. The true difficulty is to under-
stand how the arrow [of Zeno] survives the lapse of time. (pp. 68–69)
41 This can be done with the notion of C-divisibility defined in §2.5.5.
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2.5.4 Recursive prejudice
One might argue against the possibility of performing any well-ordered hypertask on the basis
of considerations about recursiveness. For each variety of modality, there is an instance of the
following argument:
Pi: It is possible to perform an α-task only if α is recursive.
Pii: Every recursive ordinal is countable.
∴ It is possible to perform an α-task only if α is countable.
Such arguments are question begging against those who admit the possibility of hypertasks.
On what basis can one argue for the various versions of Pi? Granting Pii, which is true by
definition, Pi is stronger than the conclusion. The conception of recursiveness from classical
computability theory is by definition limited to the realm of the countable, but the notion of
a recursive function is generalized in higher recursion theory to include total functions with
uncountable domains. Notions of possibility that trivially exclude uncountable well-orderings
certainly do not allow for the performance of an α-task for uncountable α. But versions of the
conclusion that involve such a notion of possibility are trivial. More interesting instances of the
argument involve notions of possibility that do not rule out hypertasks from the start.
Recalling Zermelo’s term “finitistic prejudice”, for a prejudice against what is non-finitistic,
we might call what is expressed by various instances of this argument “recursive prejudice”,
which exceeds what might be called “countable prejudice”.42
2.5.5 Divisibility arguments
This subsection defines divisibility arguments, which use a generalization of ω-divisibility.
When (C,<) is an infinite linearly ordered class, we say that T ×S1 is C-divisible iff both T
and S1 locally embed (C,<).
C-divisibility covers order types of arbitrary infinite linearly ordered classes, so we can think
of C as any infinite linear order type. C-divisibility ensures that every non-trivial bounded open
interval of T or S1 can in a manner of speaking be subdivided by the order type of C.
Using the notion of C-divisibility, the dichotomy arguments generalize as follows.
42 We address what might be called “set prejudice” in §2.6.
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There are notions of possibility ♦1, ♦2, ♦3,
a type µ (of motion), and infinite linear order types C, τ
for which these five statements hold:
P23: ♦1
(
Type µ motion in a C-divisible T ×S1 occurs.
)
P24: If there are any ♦1-worlds in which
type µ motion in a C-divisible T ×S1 occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦2-world.
P25: 2
(
Type µ motion in a C-divisible T ×S1 involves a τ -event.
)
P26: If there are any ♦2-worlds in which a τ -event occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦3-world.
P27: 3
(
No τ -event occurs.
)
This argument has a number of important kinds of special cases. For example, there are
instances that satisfy one or more of the following conditions:
• ♦1 = ♦2 = ♦3.
• Type µ includes every instance of motion.
• C = τ .
• C = ω.
• C = ω∗.
• C is non-wellfounded.
• C is a proper class.
• T and S1 are order-isomorphic to R.
• T and S1 are order-isomorphic to No.
• T and S1 are order-isomorphic.
• T and S1 are locally incomparable.
To resolve all of the instances of this general divisibility argument, one must show that
there are no values of ♦1, ♦2, ♦3, µ, C, τ for which P23–P27 hold.
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Equivalently, one has to show that
for any values of ♦1, ♦2, ♦3, µ, C, τ , at least one of P23–P27 fails.
Divisibility arguments merit further thought. For example, one can ask:
• With respect to various notions of modality, for which values of C and τ is P25 true?
• What is the relationship between C-divisibility and the order type of the event-sequence
that motion through a C-divisible T ×S1 involves?
• For various notions of modality, what conditions must the order types of T and S1 meet
so that motion through T ×S1 requires an event-sequence of a given order type?
Now we explain why certain instances of P25 are false.
Divisibility and mismatches
The general divisibility argument does not assume that there is a ♦2-world in which T and S1
are order-isomorphic. How then might one argue for instances of P25?
Recall how such premisses would be employed in a simple divisibility argument. For each
combination of a modality and an infinite linear order type C, there is an instance of the following
argument schema:
P∆: Motion through a C-divisible T ×S1 is possible.
PΩ: Necessarily, motion through a C-divisible T ×S1 involves a C-event.
PC : No C-event is possible.
∴ ⊥
Consider how one would argue for PΩ. We might begin with the following argument:
p1: T ×S1 (exists and) is C-divisible.
p2: Motion through T ×S1 occurs.
∴ A C-event occurs. (p3)
Let w be a possible world. Assuming that both p1 and p2 hold in w, one would argue that
p3 holds in w too. Conditionalization would yield
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(p1 ∧ p2) → p3.
Then the necessitation rule would give

(
(p1 ∧ p2) → p3
)
,
which is equivalent to PΩ.
Recall that we have been assuming that T and S1 are locally uniform locally symmetric
line-structures. As we will see, that assumption does not support the inference from p1 and p2
to p3. Let us examine that inference more closely.
Suppose that p1 and p2 hold in a possible world w, and that a particular motion in w is
given by a position function
s : [a, b] −→ [c, d]
with a < b and c < d, as usual. Define
s(a) := c,
s(b) := d.
To argue for p3, consider the open interval (c, d)S1 . Since T ×S1 is C-divisible, (C,<)
order-embeds into (c, d)S1 . Let
f : C −→ (c, d)S1
be an order-embedding. Then for each x∈C,
reaching the spatial point f(x)
counts as an event, and is one that must occur in order for the moving object to reach d. As we
will see, this does not guarantee that the motion described by s involves an event-sequence of
order type C. The reason is that when T and S1 are locally incomparable, it might not be the
case that for each x∈C, there is a moment at which the object is at f(x).
On the Russellian conception of motion, at least two conditions must be met in order for s
to correspond to a “smooth non-stop motion”. For simplicity, suppose that the object is a point
particle. The first condition is that there must be a change in position.
There must be distinct moments at which the object occupies distinct positions, i.e.,
∃t, t′ ∈ [a, b] (t < t′ ∧ s(t) ↓ ∧ s(t′) ↓ ∧ s(t) < s(t′)).
The second condition is that the motion be “smooth”. In the context of locally uniform locally
symmetric line-structures, we require the following.
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If an object occupies two distinct positions at two distinct times,
then there is a time that is strictly between those two times,
at which the object occupies a position strictly between those two positions, i.e.,
∀t, t′ ∈ [a, b]
((
t < t′ ∧ s(t) ↓ ∧ s(t′) ↓ ∧ s(t) 6=s(t′)) →
∃x∈(t, t′) (s(x) ↓ ∧ s(t) < s(x) < s(t′))).
Consider whether moving from c to d involves a C-event. If we assume that
T and S1 (exist and) are structured like order-isomorphic line-structures
in conjunction with p1 and p2, then (a, b)T is order-isomorphic to (c, d)S1 , and s is an order-
isomorphism and thus bijective. At each moment in the open interval of time, the point particle
in motion occupies some point in the spatial dimension. But if neither of (a, b)T and (c, d)S1
order-embeds into the other, and the object’s motion meets the two conditions mentioned above,
then there is no way for the moving object to have a spatial position at every moment in (a, b)T ,
and it cannot be that for every point in (c, d)S1 , there is some moment at which the moving
object occupies that spatial point.
The point is that T and S1 being C-divisible line-structures does not ensure that motion
(from one spatial point to another) involves an event-sequence of order type C, if, for each
spatial point in the C-ordered class of spatial points chosen, there must be a moment (i.e., a
point) in time at which the moving object occupies that spatial point.
To further strengthen the general divisibility argument, we will use two definitions.
We will say that line-structures l1 and l2 are locally comparable iff
for any non-trivial bounded open interval of l1,
and any non-trivial bounded open interval of l2,
each of those intervals order-embeds into the other.
We say that T ×S1 is locally comparable iff T and S1 are locally comparable.
Now we add the assumption of local comparability to P23, P24, and P25. This gives:
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There are notions of possibility ♦1, ♦2, ♦3,
a type µ (of motion), and infinite linear order types C, τ
for which these five statements hold:
P28: ♦1
(
Type µ motion in a locally comparable C-divisible T ×S1 occurs.
)
P29: If there are any ♦1-worlds in which
type µ motion in a locally comparable C-divisible T ×S1 occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦2-world.
P30: 2
(
Type µ motion in a locally comparable C-divisible T ×S1 involves a τ -event.
)
P31: If there are any ♦2-worlds in which a τ -event occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦3-world.
P32: 3
(
No τ -event occurs.
)
Notice that P30 is weaker than P25.
A general lapse of time argument
Finally, the lapse of time argument from §2.5.3 generalizes as follows:
There are notions of possibility ♦1, ♦2, ♦3,
and infinite linear order types C, τ
for which these five statements hold:
P33: ♦1
(T is C-divisible.)
P34: If there are any ♦1-worlds in which T is C-divisible,
then at least one of them is also a ♦2-world.
P35: 2
(
If T is C-divisible, then a τ -event occurs.)
P36: If there are any ♦2-worlds in which a τ -event occurs,
then at least one of them is also a ♦3-world.
P37: 3
(
No τ -event occurs.
)
One can ask, for example: For which values of 2, C, and τ does P35 hold?
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2.6 Maximality and indefinite extensibility
In order to explain what it is for a line-structure to be “more finely subdivided” than another,
we will use the informal notion of a collection, which is thought to be “indefinitely extensible”.43
Some collections are not sets, so we will abuse the symbols of the language of set theory. We
might instead have used the symbols
=˙, ∀˙, ∃˙, ∈˙, {˙, }˙, ∪˙, ∩˙, <˙,
etc. when dealing with collections that are not sets, or with collections in general.
We need a few definitions. Assume that our first-order language has = and <.
Let (C,<C) be a line-structure. When L and R are subsets of C, and
∀l∈L ∀r∈R l <C r,
then we write L <C R.
A cut of (C,<C) is an ordered pair 〈L,R〉 such that
L ∪R = C,
L ∩R = ∅,
L 6=∅ 6=R,
L <C R.
A cut partitions the elements of a line-structure into two collections L and R such that L < R.
Let a cut 〈L,R〉 of (C,<C) be left-closed iff
∃l∈L ∀x∈L x ≤C l;
otherwise it is left-open.
Similarly, let a cut 〈L,R〉 of (C,<C) be right-closed iff
∃r∈R ∀x∈R x ≥C r;
otherwise it is right-open.
A void of (C,<C) is a cut 〈L,R〉 of (C,<C) that is both left-open and right-open — L has
no greatest member and R has no least member.
The next definition specifies when cuts of a line-structure are equivalent.
43 Dummett (1996) writes:
An indefinitely extensible concept is one such that, if we can form a definite conception of
a totality all of whose members fall under that concept, [then] we can, by reference to that
totality, characterize a larger totality all of whose members fall under it. (p. 441)
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For any cuts 〈Lx, Rx〉 and
〈
Ly, Ry
〉
of (C,<C), define
〈Lx, Rx〉 ≡
〈
Ly, Ry
〉
as:
Lx = Ly ∨ ∃z∈C
(
Lx ∩Ry = {z}
) ∨ ∃z∈C (Rx ∩ Ly = {z}).
A break 〈L,R〉 of (C,<C) is a cut of (C,<C) that is either left-closed and right-open, or
left-open and right-closed — either L has no greatest member and R has a least, or L has a
greatest member and R has no least.
Given any line-structure (C,<C) that has voids, we can expand it to another line-structure
(C ′, <C′) by “filling in” each of its voids. For each void 〈L,R〉 of (C,<C), we can insert a point
p so that
∀l∈L ∀r∈R l <C′ p <C′ r.
C ′ is the union of C with the set of every such added point, and <C′ is the appropriate extension
of <C .
A line-structure l has a void-completion v(l), which is the result of filling in every void in l
with a point and appropriately extending the linear ordering.
A line-structure is void-complete iff it has no voids.
If instead we fill each void with a copy of (C,<C) (or a copy of any line-structure), the result
will also be a line-structure.
Given any line-structure (C,<C), we can expand it to another line-structure (C
′, <C′) as
follows. For each break 〈L,R〉 of (C,<C), we insert a copy of a line-structure in between L and
R. But the resulting line-structure has breaks of its own. Every line-structure has breaks.
Whether or not a line-structure has any voids, it can be extended to a “more finely subdi-
vided” line-structure. Take any line-structure and replace each of its points, or fill some (or all)
of its cuts with a line-structure, and the result will also be a line-structure. When the resulting
line-structure is not order-isomorphic to the original, then we say that it is more finely subdivided
than the original line-structure.
Compare how finely points are packed into R with how finely they are packed into No. R
is Dedekind complete and has no voids. No has voids; each void in No is not right next to
any surreal number. One sense in which No is more “dense” than R is that No fills in all of
the breaks that R has, as well as filling in breaks which R does not have. But No, just like
its Dedekind completion, has breaks of its own.44 No non-empty dense linear ordering without
endpoints, whether set-sized or not, is “maximally dense” in the sense of having no breaks.
44 Fornasiero (2004, §§1.9–1.10) discusses the Dedekind completion of No.
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In 1907, Hausdorff generalized the order type of the rationals.45 For each ordinal α, an
ηα-set is a linear order type such that for any subsets L,R of an ηα-set whose cardinalities are
less than ℵα, if every member of L is less than every member of R, then there is an element
that is greater than every member of L and less than every member of R.46 For each ordinal α,
Hausdorff defines a linear order type ηα such that
∀L,R ⊆ ηα
((|L|+ |R| ≤ ℵα ∧ L < R) → ∃x ∈ ηα ∀l∈L ∀r∈R l < x < r).
For example, η0 is the order type of (Q, <). There are η-sets of every infinite cardinality.47
Ordered lexicographically,
⋃
α∈On
ηα
is order-isomorphic to No, and might be called the η-class ηOn. Each η-set is an η-class, and
each η-class is a line-structure. Each η-class is maximal in the sense that any linear order of
equal or lesser size order-embeds into it.
2.6.1 The non-infinite surreals
No contains infinite numbers. If we treat T or S1 as structured like No, which has more
structure than just its order, then they will have points that are infinitely distant from one
another. One could instead treat T or S1 as having only points that are finitely distant from
one another, while still being structured like No “locally”. The point is that one can make sense
of T or S1 being as finely divisible as No even if spatiotemporal points are only finitely distant
from one another.
Define the proper class of non-infinite surreals (i.e., those surreals that are either infinitesimal
or finite) to be
No /∞ :=
{
x∈No : ∃n∈N |x| < n}.
Let No /∞ be the structure (
No /∞, 0, 1, <,+, ·
)
,
which is the reduct of No that omits the infinite surreals.
Recall that gcd(x, y) = z iff
z|x ∧ z|y ∧ ∀d ((d|x ∧ d|y) → d|z).48
45 See Plotkin (2005, p. 150).
46 For a discussion of the related notion of saturation, see Chang & Keisler (2012, Chapter 5).
47 For more discussion, see Alling (1962).
48 As usual, z|x iff ∃s z · s = x.
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No /∞ is a proper class GCD domain — a nonzero commutative Ring in which
∀x 6=0 ∀y 6=0 x · y 6=0,
∀x 6=0 ∀y 6=0 ∃z gcd(x, y) = z.
No /∞ is not even a Field — no infinitesimal in No /∞ has a multiplicative inverse in No /∞. But
locally, No /∞ is structurally similar to No, in that every non-trivial bounded open interval of
No /∞ is order-isomorphic to No.
2.6.2 A hierarchy conception
Is it metaphysically possible for a spatiotemporal dimension to be structured like No /∞? Even if
the notion of metaphysical possibility is clear enough, appealing to the mathematical possibility
of such a situation is not sufficient to establish that it is a metaphysical possibility. Huemer
(2016) makes a similar point about logical possibility:
No one should believe that a proposition is metaphysically possible merely because it
is logically possible. Similarly, here are two other types of bad reasons for ascribing
metaphysical possibility:
First, the argument from mathematical systems: in this type of argument, one cites
the existence of a coherent mathematical system as proof (or at least evidence) that
it is [metaphysically] possible for something in reality to satisfy the system. This is
fallacious. Mathematical systems in modern times are constrained by nothing other
than mere consistency and mathematicians’ sense of what is interesting — they
are not constrained by metaphysical possibility. Thus, for example, the fact that
one can develop a coherent mathematical system in which one talks about ‘infinite
numbers’ such as ℵ0, does not show that any such numbers exist or could exist. Nor,
similarly, does the existence of a consistent mathematical system for talking about
‘infinitesimal numbers’ mean that there are or could be any infinitesimal quantities.
Second, the argument by analogy: A is possible, and there is an analogy to be drawn
between A and B; therefore, B is possible. This is usually fallacious, particularly
when the analogy is based upon mere similarity of mathematical structure. (p. 105)
It is conceivable that T and S1 are more finely subdivided than No /∞.49 The notion of
49 In the 1890s, Peirce (1976) writes:
Definition 96. A whole is said to be indefinitely divisible, when any homogeneous parts of
which it may be conceived to consist, consist each of them, of smaller homogeneous parts;
and the word divisible is not understood to imply that the parts can be separated from one
another.
Illustration 40. The range of values from 0 to 1 is indefinitely divisible. For, no matter how
small the partial ranges may be taken of which it is conceived as consisting, each of these
consists of other intervals still smaller. (p. 167)
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collection of points which subdivide a linear continuum is indefinitely extensible. We defined
“line-structure” in terms of “collection”. Despite the limitations of standard set theories with
respect to proper classes, the indefinite extensibility of collection entails the indefinite extensi-
bility of line-structure.
Potter (2004) describes a conception of an indefinitely divisible continuum:50
. . . if we . . . treat infinitesimals as real [objects], we . . . have no reason not to posit a
new level of objects which are infinitesimal relative to the non-standard field. . . .
We have evidently embarked now on a process which we can iterate in much the
same manner as we iterated the construction of the set-theoretic hierarchy. If we do
this, we arrive at a conception of the continuum which is very different from, and far
richer than, the Weierstrassian one. . . . [T]he proposal now under consideration is
that we should conceive of the continuum as indefinitely divisible in much the same
way as the [set-theoretic] hierarchy is indefinitely extensible . . . (pp. 146–147)
If we take seriously the thought that a spatiotemporal dimension can always be further
subdivided, one possible view is that a dimension corresponds to an absolutely infinite hierarchy
of ever more finely subdivided linearly ordered collections of points, perhaps with some additional
structure at each level of the hierarchy. Such hierarchy conceptions of spatiotemporal dimensions
are in some respects analogous to Zermelo’s view of the universe(s) of set theory.51
We will mention two conceptual difficulties with the standard non-hierarchical conception of
spatiotemporal dimensions. On the standard conception, a dimension is a “fixed” collection of
points — in the sense of being static or completed — with some additional structure (topological,
metrical, algebraic). But there is a limit to how finely the dimension is subdivided by points.
Consequently, there is no location between a point x in the dimension, and all of the points in
that dimension that are to the right of x. No tuple of cuts corresponds to a location, and an
object moving from a point x to a point to the right of x does not “pass through” any (locations
that correspond to) tuples of cuts.52 This is the first difficulty.
Generalizing the notion of a point, define a quasi-region to be an ordered tuple, of the
appropriate arity for the given space, where each entry can be either a coordinate or a cut. Now
we can ask: Which collections of quasi-regions correspond to spatiotemporal locations? On the
standard conception, only those quasi-regions that are points correspond to a spatiotemporal
location.
It is natural to think that a moving object passes through not only (locations that correspond
to) points but (locations that correspond to) quasi-regions that are not points, as well. If a void
50 For a discussion of nonstandard extensions of R, see Hall & Todorov (2015).
51 A hierarchy conception may be relativized to a model of a set theory.
52 Here, we are not thinking of points as being tuples of cuts.
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or a break 〈L,R〉 in S1 corresponds to a determinate spatial location, then moving from a point
in L to a point in R requires moving through that location. Voids and breaks of S1 can be seen
as analogous to non-trivial intervals of S1, in that they can potentially be subdivided, unlike a
point(-singleton).
Suppose that one conceives of spatiotemporal dimensions in the standard way mentioned
above, and thinks that there is a limit to how finely they are subdivided by points. Then it must
be explained why spatiotemporal dimensions have the particular order type that they do. Why
aren’t they more finely subdivided than they are? And why aren’t they less finely subdivided
than that? The standard conception has to defend itself against charges of arbitrariness. This
is the second difficulty.
Chapter 3
Doing the uncountable
In Chapter 1 we saw how accounts of (our knowledge of) truth in first-order arithmetic can make
use of supertasks. This chapter explains how hypertasks could in principle yield knowledge
of physical situations. We argue that whether certain propositions are knowable depends on
whether the temporal dimension allows for hypertasks.1
Motivation
Since the 1960s, mathematicians have developed generalizations of classical computability the-
ory that study computations of transfinite length.2 Philosophers have paid little attention to
epistemic questions about what results from performing infinite sequences of tasks, and in par-
ticular, uncountable task-sequences. For example, how might we know what would result from
the performance of a supertask, or even a hypertask?
In almost every supertask or hypertask discussed, exactly what occurs at each stage is known
beforehand. A well known example of such a supertask is one first stated in 1953 by Littlewood
(1986, p. 26).3 Ross (2012, pp. 46–48) describes a supertask in which what occurs at each stage
is not known beforehand.4 If what results from performing such a sequence of tasks depends only
1 Since the propositions in question do not concern the structure of time, the claim is not trivial.
2 See Sacks (2017) and Hinman (2017).
3 This supertask was later discussed by Allis & Koetsier (1991).
4 Ross describes a variant of Littlewood’s supertask. In Ross’s case, at each stage, what occurs
depends on a random selection among ℵ0 possibilities. Thus, there are 2ℵ0 possible ω-tasks, and
uncountably many distinct possible end results.
Probability measures that are real-valued assign outcomes that are infinitely unlikely (in the sense of
occurring in only countably many out of uncountably many possibilities in total) a value of zero. How-
ever, there are reasons to sometimes prefer probability measures that can take (nonzero) infinitesimal
values. See Benci, Horsten & Wenmackers (2016).
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on what occurs at each stage — holding fixed some possible physical laws — then information
about what occurs at each stage of the sequence is crucial for determining what would result
from performing the entire sequence of tasks. A natural question is:
Without complete knowledge of what occurs at each stage of an infinite sequence of tasks,
to what extent can we determine what would result from performing that task-sequence?
This question motivates thinking about the kinds of idealized situations that we will analyze.
Main claim
This chapter shows that the structure of time can have epistemological consequences. We
describe a way in which the mathematical structure of time constrains what is possible to know.
In particular, the temporal continuum’s cardinal characteristics and order-theoretic properties
impose limitations on which kinds of sequences of tasks can be completed in a bounded interval
of time. This in turn may limit which propositions are knowable.
We describe a situation, based on Littlewood’s supertask, in which knowing that a particular
state obtains requires that an uncountable sequence of tasks be completed. Only those possible
worlds in which
a bounded interval of time contains uncountably many
non-trivial pairwise non-overlapping subintervals
allow hypertasks.5 For example, no possible world in which time is structured like R is one
in which a hypertask is performed. We exhibit a simple proposition such that whether we can
know that that proposition holds depends on whether the structure of time is compatible with
the completion of a hypertask.
There are propositions p that satisfy the condition
“p is knowable in a possible world w only if a hypertask may be performed in w”
in uninteresting ways. For example, assume that for every possible world w,
every proposition that is knowable in w is true in w.
Then the proposition that a hypertask may be performed in w satisfies the condition. We will
describe a proposition that satisfies the condition in a more interesting way.
5 This fails if we allow that a task may be completed instantaneously (i.e., in a single moment).
Recall that a trivial interval either contains only one point, or is empty.
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3.1 A button and a rule
Assume that T is a non-empty dense linear order without endpoints. Treat T as the ordered
collection — it may be a proper class — of every moment in time. We assume that T is locally
uniform, meaning that all of its bounded intervals of the form (a, b), where a < b, are order-
isomorphic to one another. We also assume that T is locally symmetric, meaning that each
of its bounded intervals of the form (a, b), where a < b, is order-isomorphic to that interval’s
inverse order.
Assume that there is an urn which initially contains some (un)known number of marbles,
and that there is a button which can be pressed instantaneously and obeys the following rule.6
For any moment t, if the button is (being) pressed at t, then:
if there is at least one marble in the urn at t, then exactly one marble is removed
instantaneously from the urn at t; otherwise, no marble is removed from the urn at t.
If a press of the button removes a marble from the urn, we do not know which marble was
removed by that press. Finally, no marble ever changes with respect to whether it is in the urn
unless that is a result of some press(es) of the button. For any moment t, if the button is not
(being) pressed at t, then no marble is removed at t.
Define a moment-set to be a bounded subcollection of T that represents the moments t such
that we intend to press the button at t. The variable ‘M ’ will always stand for a moment-set. If
M is our moment-set, then every moment t /∈ M is such that we intend not to press the button
at t. As we will see, it may not be possible to press the button at every moment that we intend
to do so.
Define a pressed-set to be a bounded subcollection of T that represents all and only the
moments at which the button is actually pressed.7 The variable ‘P ’ will always stand for a
pressed-set. We will see that some moment-sets do not determine a unique pressed-set — some
moment-sets are compatible with more than one pressed-set. Also, some pressed-sets do not
uniquely determine which marbles they will remove on a given occasion.
3.2 Finitely many objects in R-like time
We first consider cases in which the urn initially contains finitely many marbles. Several remarks
there will also apply to cases in which the urn initially contains infinitely many marbles.
6 This idealization may be relaxed by allowing that the button can be pressed in any non-trivial
interval of time.
7 We are not requiring that pressed-sets or moment-sets be definable in any particular language.
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Depending on the structure of T and on how many marbles are initially contained in the
urn, a moment-set M may result in a pressed-set that is a proper subset of M . For example,
suppose that T is structured like R. What happens if we try to hold the button down beginning
at t = 0 and ending at t = 1? In this case, our moment-set is [0, 1]R.
Suppose that the urn initially contains exactly two marbles, and that we do not know this
beforehand. The first press occurs at t = 0, when one marble is removed. Then only one marble
remains in the urn. The remaining intended presses are to occur at every moment in (0, 1]R.
But that interval has no earliest moment. If the remaining marble is removed, it is removed at
a unique moment. If the button were being held down at every moment in (0, 1]R, then for any
moment in that interval, there is an earlier moment in that interval by which the final marble
should already have been removed.
Because of the rule that governs the button, if the button is (being) pressed at some moment
t, and no marble is removed at t, then the urn must not contain any marbles at t. So if the urn
did contain at least one marble at t, and no marble was removed at t, then it must be that the
button was not (being) pressed at t. Thus, in cases in which T is structured like R and exactly
two marbles are initially in the urn, if we try to hold the button down during every moment in
[0, 1]R, we would not succeed in holding the button down during that interval, i.e., pressing the
button at every moment in the interval.8
One way of describing this situation is to say that the button would pop up immediately
after t = 0 when a marble is removed. If we do not press the button again after it pops up, the
button will be in the unpressed position at every moment in (0, 1]R, so the remaining marble
is not removed at any moment in that interval. In this case, the moment-set [0, 1]R results in
the pressed-set {0}. We could, of course, press the button again at any moment in (0, 1]R. But
doing so would require that we choose some moment in that interval at which to press the button
again. The moment-set [0, 1]R by itself does not determine a choice of such a moment.
Similar situations can occur even if we do not try to hold the button down. For example,
suppose again that T is structured like R, and that for some unknown positive integer n, there
are exactly n marbles initially in the urn. In this case, because of the rule that governs the
button, it cannot be pressed at all and only every moment in a non-empty non-wellfounded
class of moments.
For example, consider the moment-set
M :=
{
1
2n
: n∈N
}
.
Every moment in M is preceded by infinitely many other moments in M . But only finitely many
marbles are initially contained in the urn. Under these conditions, M results in the pressed-set
8 The same reasoning applies when the number of marbles that the urn initially contains is countable
and greater than 2.
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∅. For any moment t, a marble can be removed at t only if the result of adding one to the
cardinality of the class of all presses that have occurred before t is less than or equal to the
cardinality of the class of all marbles that were initially in the urn. The class of presses made
before the urn contains zero marbles cannot be greater in cardinality than the class of marbles
initially in the urn. Thus, none of the intended presses could be carried out.
Suppose that we know that the urn initially contains some positive finite number n of marbles,
but that we do not know the value of n. We wish to remove every marble in such a way that
we will know beforehand that we will succeed in doing so.
Q18 (informally): Which moment-sets would ensure, regardless of which finite number
of marbles are initially in the urn, that every marble would be removed?
Conjecture: The answer to Q18 is that it is necessary and sufficient that a moment-set
have an initial segment of order type ω.
With T structured like R, and an unknown positive finite number of marbles initially in
the urn, in order to know beforehand that every marble would be removed as a result of a
moment-set, we must know that we would succeed in pressing the button infinitely many times.
Since there are only finitely many marbles, infinitely many of those pressings will not remove
any marble. But there would be no press such that we know that that press will fail to remove a
marble. We will see that depending on the structure of T , an analogous phenomenon can occur
at the countable/uncountable level when we have ℵ0 marbles.
3.3 A formalization
First we formalize what can happen given a pressed-set, ignoring which moment-sets could have
resulted in that pressed-set. We will use the “is earlier than” relation < on T , and that relation’s
inverse, the “is later than” relation > on T .
For any S ⊆ T and x∈T , we write S<x for
{y∈S : y < x},
and similarly for S≤x, S>x, and S≥x.
Outcomes
Let κ be a cardinal that represents the collection of marbles initially in the urn. Let P be a
pressed-set. Given a triple 〈T , κ, P 〉, we define a total function
R : T −→ P(κ)
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that assigns to each t ∈ T some subset of κ that represents the collection of marbles that
have been removed at or before t. For some such triples, there will be more than one of these
mappings.
We write α@β (read “α is removed at β”) for
α∈R(β) ∧ ∀q∈T<β α /∈R(q).
We write α/@β (read “α is not removed at β”) for ¬(α@β).
R is defined as follows.
For each t∈T , we require that t 7→ R(t) in such a way that:
no marble is removed before any presses have occurred, i.e.,
(1) ∀t∈T ((∀x∈P t < x) → R(t) = ∅)
once a marble is removed, it remains removed thereafter, i.e.,
(2) ∀x, y∈T (x < y → R(x) ⊆ R(y))
no marble is removed at any moment unless the button is pressed at that moment, i.e.,
(3) ∀t∈T ((∃x∈κ x@t) → t∈P )
if there is a marble not removed by any prior press, then this press removes one, i.e.,
(4) ∀t∈P
((∃x∈κ ∀s∈P<t x/@s) → ∃x∈κ x@t)
and only one marble, if any, is removed at a time, i.e.,
(5) ∀t∈P ((∃x∈κ x@t) → ∃!x∈κ x@t).
We say that any such function R is an outcome for 〈T , κ, P 〉. Each outcome encodes which
marbles, if any, were removed from the urn at each moment as a result of that outcome. The
graph of an outcome can be linearly ordered in the obvious way using the < relation.
We can then prove that whenever a marble is removed, the number of marbles removed so
far is equal to the number of presses made so far. I.e., for every 〈T , κ, P 〉, every outcome R for
that triple is such that
∀t∈P
(
(∃x∈κ x@t) → ∣∣R(t)∣∣ = ∣∣P≤t∣∣).
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We can also prove that if no marble is removed when the button is pressed, then no marbles
remain in the urn. I.e., for every 〈T , κ, P 〉, every outcome R for that triple is such that
∀t∈P ((¬∃x∈κ x@t) → R(t) = κ).
Q19 (informally): Which moment-sets are such that before we begin any presses,
we can know that if we try to press the button at exactly those times,
then whatever sequence of pressings that we actually succeed in making
will remove every marble?
We formalize Q19 below.
Compatibility
We need to formalize the relationship between moment-sets and pressed-sets. A moment-set can
be “compatible with” multiple pressed-sets. In any given situation, only one pressed-set actually
results. But on another occasion with the same initial conditions, a different pressed-set may
result.
For example, consider the triple 〈R,ℵ0,M〉 with the moment-set
M :=
{
n
n+ 1
: n∈N
}
∪ [1, 2]R.
If every marble is such that it is removed before t = 1, then M results in the pressed-set P = M .
In this case, the button does not “pop up”. Alternatively, if, e.g., every even-numbered marble
— but no odd-numbered marble — is such that it is removed before t = 1, then M results in
the pressed-set P = M≤1. This is the case in which the button “pops up”. More specifically, at
every time t > 1, the button is in the unpressed position.
Informally, saying that each of the pressed-sets P = M and P = M≤1 is “compatible with”
that triple means that, given T , κ, and the intention to press the button at all and only the
moments in M , and given the rule that governs the button, it is possible to press the button at
all and only the moments in that pressed-set.
Extending outcomes
Next we define what it is for an outcome to be an “extension” of another outcome. We can
extend an outcome (in the sense of extending a function) by enlarging the domain to include a
moment that is later than every other moment that was originally in the domain.
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Let R1 be an outcome for 〈T , κ, P 〉. Let t∈T be such that
∀x∈P x < t.
Let R2 be an outcome for〈T , κ, P ∪ {t}〉.
Then we say that R1 extends to R2 (or that R2 extends R1) iff
R2P = R1.
Now we define what it is for a pressed-set to be “compatible with” a triple.
Let T be a non-empty dense linear ordering without endpoints, let κ be a cardinal, let M
be a moment-set, and let P ⊆ M . Then we say that a pressed-set P is compatible with
〈T , κ,M〉 iff ∀t∈M :
t∈P ⇐⇒ there is an outcome for 〈T , κ, P<t〉
that extends to an outcome for
〈T , κ, P<t ∪ {t}〉.
Winning outcomes, winning pressed-sets, and winning moment-sets
Finally we define what it is for:
(i) an outcome to remove every marble,
(ii) a triple containing a pressed -set to “ensure” that every marble is removed,
(iii) a triple containing a moment-set to “ensure” that every marble will be removed.
We will use the term ‘wins’ in each of these three types of cases.
When R is an outcome for 〈T , κ, P 〉, we say that R wins iff
∃t∈T R(t) = κ.
I.e., at some time, every marble has been removed.
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We say that a triple 〈T , κ, P 〉 wins iff
there is an outcome for that triple,
and every outcome for that triple wins.
We say that a triple 〈T , κ,M〉 wins iff
there is a pressed-set that is compatible with that triple,
and for every pressed-set P that is compatible with that triple,
〈T , κ, P 〉 wins.
Q18 (formally): Which order types of moment-sets M are such that
∀n∈N, the triple 〈R, n,M〉 wins?
Proposition: For any moment-set M ⊂ R:
M has an initial segment of order type ω ⇐⇒ for each n∈Z+, 〈R, n,M〉 wins.
Proof : The ⇒ direction is trivial. For ⇐, use induction on n to show that ∀n∈Z+ and
for any moment-set M ⊂ R,
〈R, n,M〉 wins =⇒ M has an initial segment of order type n.
Then in order for it to be the case that ∀n ∈ Z+, 〈R, n,M〉 wins, M must have initial
segments of every finite order type. 
We end this section with an open question.
Q19 (formally): Given T and κ, which order types of moment-sets M are such that
〈T , κ,M〉 wins?
3.4 ℵ0 objects in R-like time
Suppose that the urn contains ℵ0 marbles. We can think of each marble as corresponding to a
unique natural number, and each natural number as corresponding to a unique marble. Then
each possible emptying of the urn corresponds to a unique (up to order-isomorphism) linear
ordering on N, i.e., a countably infinite order type. Each such ordering has the order type of the
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collection of moments at which marbles were removed, and encodes which marble was removed
at each position in that ordering.
An interesting special case of Q19 is:
Q20: Which order types of moment-sets M are such that 〈R,ℵ0,M〉 wins?
Proposition: For no moment-set M ⊂ R does 〈R,ℵ0,M〉 win.
Proof : In order for 〈R,ℵ0,M〉 to win, M must have initial segments of every countable
wellfounded order type. So M would need to have an initial segment with order type ω1.
But no subset of R has that order type. 
If the urn initially contains ℵ0 marbles, then in order to know that we have removed every
marble, we must perform uncountably many attempted removals. If the order type of T does not
allow for hypertasks, then we cannot know that we have removed every marble. Thus, whether
we can know that
every marble has been removed
depends on whether the structure of time is compatible with the completion of a hypertask.
3.5 Other temporal structures
We end this chapter with two open questions about the relationship between the order type of
T and the order types of winning moment-sets.
First, we can ask: What structures of time are compatible with there being a moment-
set that would ensure that when the urn initially contains ℵ0 marbles, every marble would be
removed? This motivates:
Q21: Which order types of T are such that there is a moment-set M for which both
(i) there is a pressed-set that is compatible with 〈T ,ℵ0,M〉,
and
(ii) every pressed-set P that is compatible with 〈T ,ℵ0,M〉 is such that 〈T ,ℵ0, P 〉 wins?
Second, we can ask: Given the structure of time, how many marbles could be initially in the
urn, with there still being a moment-set that would ensure that every marble would be removed?
This motivates:
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Q22: Given T , for which infinite cardinals κ is there a moment-set M such that both
(i) there is a pressed-set that is compatible with 〈T , κ,M〉,
and
(ii) every pressed-set P that is compatible with 〈T , κ,M〉 is such that 〈T , κ, P 〉 wins?
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